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Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity
Mark S. Brodin*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 is in its third decade and
yet there remain several fundamental questions concerning its applica-
tion that are unresolved by the courts.2 This article deals with one such
issue-the extent to which employers can legally justify discriminatory
practices on the basis of cost containment and profit maximization. Put
another way, what financial costs can courts properly impose upon busi-
ness in the effort to enforce the equal opportunity principle?
It is now widely recognized that the obstacles to achievement of real
equality in the workplace lie not so much in the remnants of overt big-
otry, but rather in the ostensibly neutral practices of employers which
operate subtly (often times unintentionally) to limit opportunities for mi-
norities and women.3 An employer that adopts a college degree prereq-
uisite for appointment to a particular position may be motivated solely by
the desire to minimize the administrative costs of its selection process
(i.e., by utilizing an inexpensive screening device). The selection process
will, however, exclude minorities to the extent that they are under-
represented in the group of applicants with college degrees. Similarly, a
hospital that pays its nurses the going wage may be motivated solely by
the desire to contain its labor costs. If the market rate is depressed be-
cause of gender segregation in that profession, the practice will result in
female employees being paid less than the inherent worth their work
might otherwise command. The chemical manufacturer whose fetal vul-
nerability program excludes women from positions which involve expo-
sure to potentially hazardous substances may be acting out of a desire to
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1969,J.D. 1972, Columbia University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of a research grant awarded by Boston College
for this project.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to e-17 (1982) (hereinafter "Title VII").
2 Professor Owen Fiss observed in 1970 that there is "a growing uncertainty as to the limits of
the obligation imposed by [antidiscrimination] laws, and this uncertainty often creates a dilemma for
employers and enforcement agencies." Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHi. L. Rv. 235
(1970).
3 Prior to the adoption of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the Senate Committee observed:
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and
distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some identifiable
individual or organization .... Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more
complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally de-
scribe the problem in terms of 'systems' and 'effect' rather than simply intentional wrongs,
and the literature on the subject is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics
of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act discrimi-
natory practices through various institutional devices, and testing and validation
requirements.
S. REP. No. 92-415, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1971).
Similarly, investigation of the problem of age discrimination indicates that its primary cause is
the employer's desire to reduce labor costs, and not animus against older workers. See Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6, 34.
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avoid wide ranging tort liability to yet unborn persons; the effect never-
theless will be to restrict employment opportunities for women at the
plant.
The seminal principle of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4 subjects such prac-
tices to scrutiny under Tide VII without regard to their non-discrimina-
tory motivation. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in 1971,
declared that the congressional purpose behind that Act requires "the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of ra-
cial or other impermissible classification." 5 The unanimous Court held
that Tide VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation"; it is "the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation," that Con-
gress intended to address.6
The Griggs decision does permit an employer to use a selection de-
vice notwithstanding its discriminatory effect if it "bear[s] a demonstra-
ble relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was
used. ' 7 At another point the Court states that Tide VII's "touchstone is
business necessity." s The decision left definition and development of
these concepts for a future day, with basic questions unaddressed. Are
job relation and business necessity separate defenses, the former focus-
ing on job performance and the latter on some other business concern
like cost avoidance? Or is job relation the only form of business neces-
sity that can justify disparate impact? If business necessity is an in-
dependent defense, how necessary must the challenged practice be to the
business? Are efficiency and profitability sufficient to establish business
necessity or must the practice be necessary to avoid bankruptcy? Is there
an absolute standard of necessity, or is it a cost-benefit analysis in which
the harm to equal employment opportunities is weighed against the em-
ployer's benefit in continuing the practice? Although courts must re-
solve these questions to enforce Title VII in the workplace, 9 they have
yet to render definitive responses to them. This Article explores the cen-
tral issue, whether wealth maximization can constitute business
necessity?
4 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5 Id. at 431.
6 Id at 431-32. Thus disparate treatment cases involve action that is deliberately motivated by
racial or other impermissible grounds, while dispatate impact cases involve facially neutral practices
which, whatever their motivation, adversely affect identifiable protected groups. See International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
7 401 U.S. at 431.
8 Id.
9 As one writer has asserted, "the rigor with which the business necessity defense is applied is
the clearest benchmark of the continuing national commitment to the principle of equal opportunity
in employment." Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA.
L. REv. 376, 379 (1981). "In evaluating the enforcement of a particular piece of legislation, the most
telling feature of the statute to scrutinize is the legislative or judicial exceptions to liability under it.
In the context of Title VII, the focus of such an inquiry necessarily falls on the business necessity
defense. As the broadest exception under Title VII, the business necessity defense defines the outer
limits of the Act's potential effectiveness." Id. at 378.
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When the Griggs court recognized that the problem of discrimination
must be addressed from an institutional perspective, rather than one
searching for culpable bigots,10 Title VII emerged as a regulatory
scheme with the potential to effect thorough-going change in the opera-
tion of American business.' As has been observed, however, "remedy-
ing inequality normally costs money."12 If cost avoidance can constitute
justification for practices that fall disproportionately upon minorities and
women, Title VII may be swept back in time to the pre-Griggs days when
the motivation behind (rather than the effect of) an employment practice
was the litmus test for measuring compliance.
The Supreme Court has asserted that "neither Congress nor the
courts have recognized [a cost justification] defense under Title VII."' 3
While this is substantially accurate in disparate treatment cases, it is not
so with regard to impact cases. In fact, courts have frequently accepted a
cost defense 14 in impact cases, although the decisions do not denominate
it as such.' 5 This phenomenon has attracted little attention, though its
implications for equal employment law are momentus.
It is the thrust of this Article that allowing cost justification as a de-
fense in either impact or treatment cases is inconsistent with the goals of
the Act. These goals dictate that the only legitimate reason for discrimi-
nating against persons in the workplace is their inability to perform the
job, not the expense of accommodating their special needs. Moreover it
is submitted that judicial acceptance of a cost based defense in impact
cases but not in cases alleging intentional discrimination reflects a linger-
ing fault consciousness which has no proper basis in employment law. 16
The Article begins with an overview of the manner in which equal
opportunity goals may conflict with the employer's interest in wealth
10 See generally Freeman, Legitimizing Race Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
11 Shortly after Griggs one writer described the statute as "regulatory social legislation designed
to change conduct and eradicate discriminatory social practices." Note, Facially Neutral Criteria and
Discrimination Under Title VII: "Built-in Headwinds" or Permissible Practices?, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 97, 100
(1973).
12 EEOC Decision No. 72-1292, 1973 EEOC Dec. 464.
13 See Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978); infra notes
35-47 and accompanying text.
14 As used in this Article, the term "cost defense" refers to justification offered by an employer
other than that related to the ability of persons to efficiently perform the particular job in question.
Such justification includes containment of costs in the areas of personnel administration, training,
salaries and fringe benefits, and avoidance of the risk of tort liability arising from workplace hazards.
15 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has considered giving formal recognition
to a cost defense in Title VII litigation. See Oversight Hearing on EEOC's Proposed Modification of Enforce-
ment Regulations, Including Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-
208 (1985) (Statement of William Robinson, exec. dir. Lawyer's Comm. for Civil Rights under Law).
This appears to be part of a broader picture: "Cost-benefit analysis has been elevated to the top of
the administrative agenda by the Reagan Administration's program for regulatory reform. The Ad-
ministration came to power assailing the costs created by governmental intervention in the economy,
and it has tried to make comparison of costs and benefits a central element of federal regulation."
See Schwartz, The Court and Cost-benefit Analysis: An Administrative Law Idea Whose Time Has Come-Or
Gone?, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 291 (1981), (citing Executive Order 12,291 (February 17, 1981), which
requires agencies to prepare "regulatory impact analysis" of proposed regulations).
16 See generally Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination: The Seniority Question
Under Title VII, 62 N.C.L. REV. 943 (1984).
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maximization. It then contrasts the rejection of cost justification in dis-
parate treatment cases with the increasing acceptance of such justifica-
tion, under the rubric of business necessity, in impact cases. Lastly it
critiques this nonuniform approach to the cost defense and discusses its
implications.
I. The Clash Between the Antidiscrimination Principle
and Employer Self-Interest
Common to all fair employment legislation is the prohibition against
making decisions based on enumerated characteristics which are unre-
lated to productivity on the job. As Owen Fiss has observed, such legis-
lation "does no more than prohibit businessmen from making
employment decisions on the basis of race or color-a criterion whose
use would in any event impair rather than advance productivity and
wealth maximization for the individual businessman and for society as a
whole."' 7 It would appear, then, that the antidiscrimination principle
should be virtually self-enforcing, either by the employer in its own inter-
est or by the competitive market.' 8
17 Fiss, supra note 2, at 237. In a recent essay, Professor Donahue argues that Title VII does
indeed enhance economic efficiency. Donahue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986).
18 An employer that discriminates, after all, must pay a price: it has artificially contracted its
supply of available labor and therefore has tended to raise the price of labor it purchases. If
many employers do this, the price (wages) of their work force will climb. Competitors will
be able to exploit the pool of excluded black workers at lower wages, thus gaining a com-
petitive advantage. If competition worked in that way, discrimination would be corrected
by the market, without the need for legal intervention.
M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RIcHAIDS, CASES & MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 116
(1982) [hereinafter cited as MATERIALs ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION]. See also Donahue, supra
note 17; Johnson, The Stagnant South, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 8, 1986, at 40, observing
that "[n]eoclassical economic theory holds that such racial discrimination is inefficient and will cause
firms that practice it to slip behind in the competitive struggle." Richard Posner has asserted that in
a competitive market,
there are economic forces working to minimize discrimination .... In a market of many
sellers one can expect the intensity of the prejudice against blacks to vary considerably.
Some sellers will have only a mild prejudice against them. These sellers will not forego as
many advantageous transactions with blacks as their more prejudiced competitors (unless
the law interferes). Their costs will therefore be lower and this will enable them to increase
their share of the market. The least prejudiced sellers will come to dominate the market in
much the same way as people who are least afraid of heights come to dominate occupations
that require working at heights: They demand a smaller premium.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 27.1 (3d ed. 1986). See also American Nurses' Ass'n v.
Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986), in which Judge Posner discusses market equilibrium in the
context of comparable worth theory.
The Supreme Court has at times pointed out the harmony between equal opportunity and em-
ployer self-interest. In holding that the Nashville Gas Co. was in violation of Title VII because of its
pregnancy leave policy, for example, the Court observed:
Indeed, petitioner's policy of denying accumulated seniority to employees returning
from pregnancy leave might easily conflict with its own economic and efficiency interests. In
particular, as a result of petitioner's policy, inexperienced employees are favored over ex-
perienced employees; employees who have spent lengthy periods with petitioner and might
be expected to be more loyal to the company are displaced by relatively new employees.
Female employees may also be less motivated to perform efficiently in theirjobs because of
the greater difficulty of advancing through the firm.
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 n.5 (1977). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("The broad overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and con-
sumer, is the efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral em-
ployment and personnel decisions.").
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Yet discrimination has not been driven out of the marketplace by
internal forces. Indeed, "the passage of Title VII demonstrates that
Congress believed that prevailing market forces would not eliminate dis-
crimination in employment."' 9 Economists have posited several theories
to explain this phenomenon. 20 Some, like Richard Posner, blame gov-
ernment interference in the normal operation of the market. 21 Others
like Gary Becker allude to the "taste for discrimination", suggesting that
some employers may be willing to forego increased earnings in order to
maintain associational, social or political preferences. 22 Owen Fiss has
enumerated several situations in which the antidiscrimination/merit
principle is not self-enforcing. These include instances where the em-
ployer has several candidates for a position and each is of equal produc-
tive potential, thus permitting the employer to base its decision on race
without sacrificing economic advantage; where the employer has dele-
gated personnel decisions to a bureaucracy or labor union not sharing in
the incentive to maximize wealth; and where the employer acts on the
basis of inadequate or erroneous information regarding prospective
productivity. 23
But an insight into the phenomenon of continuing discrimination
that should not be overlooked is that some forms of discrimination are
not irrational economically. Put another way, the fair employment princi-
ple at times conflicts with the employer's pursuit of profit maximization,
at least in the short run. In these situations, the market will not discour-
age discrimination; rather, the law must supply its own constraints.
Using race or gender as a selection criterion, for example, can be an
inexpensive method of personnel administration compared to alterna-
tives like testing or interviewing. 24 In a similar manner, imposing educa-
19 See Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the Employment Rights of Women,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 839 (1981).
20 See generally G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); R. POSNER, supra
note 18; WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SoUTm: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY SINCE THE
CIVL WAR (1986); Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N.C.L. REv. 271 (1965).
21 R. POSNER, supra note 18.
22 G. BECKER, supra note 20, at 14.
23 Fiss, supra note 2, at 250-51.
24 "Practical economic pressures produce a climate in which employers may forego expensive,
sophisticated testing devices for less accurate measures that they can apply quickly and inexpen-
sively." See McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1015
(1981). As Professor Fiss has noted,
race is an easy criterion to apply, and the good businessman may decide accurately that the
savings derived from applying this easy criterion (administrative costs) will offset the costs
of occasional mistakes, that is, the loss of increased productivity that might result from
excluding Negroes from his work force or from using them only for nonskilled jobs.
Fiss, supra note 2, at 257.
Professor Blumrosen has referred to the theory of "statistical discrimination," in which
employers seek to minimize risk of uncertainty inherent in the hiring process. If employers
believe women or blacks are less productive than the majority of men, they will hire blacks
or women only if their wage rate is lower than that of white men. An employer has no idea
if any particular worker is qualified for the job but believes that the probability that a ran-
dom white male worker is qualified is greater than the probability that a woman or black is
qualified. To avoid costs involved in estimating the potential employee's productivity, the
employer assesses the applicant on the basis of preconceptions and sterotypes about the
group to which the applicant belongs rather than on the basis of an individualized judg-
ment. Thus, if the employer believes that women or blacks have a looser attachment to the
[Vol. 62:318
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don or experience requirements can keep selection and training costs
low. An unintended by-product may be disproportionate exclusion of
minorities or women. 25
Race or gender may also be an economically beneficial basis for ex-
cluding groups of applicants where there is a strong customer preference
for employees of a particular group, 26 such as the apparent passenger
preference for female flight attendants.27 The desire to avoid the costs
(or the risk of costs) of personnel conflicts is another reason the rational
employer may seek to maintain a homogeneous workforce.28 In another
context, a cost conscious company might decide to "screen out weaker
workers rather than make the improvements necessary to reduce lifting
requirements for all employees, or exclude fertile women from a work-
place that exposes them to chemicals rather than implement technologi-
cal changes to decrease the exposure of all employees." 29 And, of
course, an employer seeking to limit labor costs might be wise to dis-
charge its older workers whose salaries and benefits are more costly than
their younger colleagues.30
In sum, even though race and gender are unrelated to productivity,
they can nevertheless serve as the basis for cost conscious decision mak-
ing.3 ' It is in these situations that Tide VII is most critically needed to
enforce the equality principle.3 2 Such enforcement will necessarily re-
quire the imposition of costs on the offending employer. Aside from the
actual expense of litigation, such costs will include: increased expense of
personnel administration (e.g., where an employer is compelled to adopt
a nondiscriminatory selection process, or a training program to increase
access to the workforce); loss of business (e.g. where customer prefer-
ence is frustrated by the departure from discriminatory practices); in-
creased costs of maintaining a heterogeneous instead of homogeneous
labor market, are likely to be more casual about the job, are more likely to be late or absent,
that their turnover will be higher, or that women with preschool children are unreliable
employees, they will act on those perceptions regardless of their accuracy.
Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 399, 447-48 (1979). As has been noted, the " 'rationality' [of the employer's conduct] will
obviously vary depending on the relationship between stereotype and statistical reality." MATERIALS
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 18, at 118.
25 See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424; Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
26 See Fiss, supra note 2, at 257.
27 See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971).
28 See Fiss, supra note 2, at 258:
The costs in productivity due to the exclusion or limitation of blacks are offset by the de-
crease in costs that might otherwise arise because of the personnel conflicts or because it
would be necessary to employ more supervisors to minimize the personnel conflicts gener-
ated by higher levels of black employment.
See, e.g., Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 727 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1984) (employer's
refusal to promote black employee was based on realistic fear of violent reaction on part of white
employees).
29 McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 24, at 1020. See infra text accompanying notes 185-96.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 232-41.
31 See Fiss, supra note 2, at 257.
32 See Fiss, supra note 2, at 252; McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 24, at 1013. Note, Business
Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 102
(1974).
19871
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
workforce (e.g., where the employer must install new facilities to accom-
modate women or handicapped persons); increased labor costs (e.g.,
where the employer must undo disparate wage structures); increased
costs of health care (e.g., where the employer is ordered to maintain
older workers on the payroll).
At a time when Title VII jurisprudence was in its infancy, Owen Fiss
observed:
Conceivably, fair employment laws could be written or construed
to permit the businessman to [engage in cost-cutting measures that are
racially based or race related]. The theory could be that the em-
ployer's decision was not based on the individual's race, but on the
employer's interest in wealth maximization. Or it might be said that in
these instances the general assumption that race is irrelevant to pro-
ductivity is wrong. However, that option has not traditionally been
chosen. Instead, fair employment laws have been understood to pro-
hibit the use of race as a symptom, to prohibit limiting the number of
blacks in deference to customers' taste for discrimination or as a
means of avoiding personnel conflicts, and to prohibit the institution
of the differential-wage structure. They have been understood to pro-
hibit these practices without regard to whether they are instituted by
the good businessman, the one who has no interest but to maximize
wealth.33
As will be seen below, however, the federal courts have not always
placed the fair employment principle above the employer's goal of
wealth maximization. They have not consistently imposed the costs of
compliance with Title VII on employers. As a result, in significant in-
stances minorities and females have had to continue to bear the burdens
of practices which adversely affect them.34
II. The Cost Defense Under Title VII: The Differing Approaches in
Treatment and Impact Litigation
A. Manhart
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart 3 5 involved a chal-
lenge to the employer's practice of requiring female employees to con-
tribute approximately 15% more of their salary into the retirement
program than their male counterparts (meaning that women took home
15% less pay than men at the same salary level). Since the monthly bene-
fits after retirement were equal for men and women of the same age,
seniority and salary, it was alleged that this practice of exacting greater
contributions from women constituted gender discrimination in violation
of Title VII. There was no dispute that the employer was determining
33 Fiss, supra note 2, at 259. Fiss stated in the same piece, however, with some apparent contra-
diction: "The employer's interest in wealth maximization and the rigors ofthe marketplace are gen-
erally acknowledged in fair employment laws. A fair employment law is a limited corrective strategy
and the societal interest in efficiency is a major limitation." Id. at 303.
34 It has been noted that the effect of discrimination is to redistribute wealth from the victim
group to the dominant group of workers. See Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DIsCRIMINATION
IN LABOR MARKETS 8 (Ashenfelter & Rees eds. 1973).
35 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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the level of contribution on the basis of sex. The only question before
the court was whether such practice was justified under the statute.
The Department's defense relied on mortality tables indicating that
female employees on average would live several years longer than males.
The employer's cost of a pension for the average woman would thus be
greater than for the average man, since more monthly payments would
be made.
While "the reality of differences in human mortality" was not ques-
tioned,36 the Court held that the challenged practice violated Title VII
because it amounted to "treatment of a person in a manner which but for
that person's sex would be different."37 The statute, the Court held,
mandates that employers treat their employees as individuals, and not
simply as components of a group. Thus even though the generalization
that women as a class live longer than men is "unquestionably true", 38
the employer could not base its contribution scheme on gender distinc-
tion. "If height is required for a job, a tall woman may not be refused
employment merely because, on the average, women are too short. Even
a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disquali-
fying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply."'3 9
In response to the employer's contention that the differential contri-
bution scheme was justified by the "difference in the cost of providing
benefits for the respective classes,"' 40 the Court wrote: "That argument
might prevail if Tide VII contained a cost-justification defense compara-
ble to the affirmative defense available in a price discrimination suit. But
neither Congress nor the courts have recognized such a defense under
Title VII." 4 1 The Court noted that a "broad cost-differential defense was
proposed and rejected when the Equal Pay Act became law," 42 and im-
36 See Id. at 726 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37 See id at 711.
38 Id at 707.
39 lId at 708.
40 Id at 716.
41 lid at 716-17 (footnotes omitted). The Court elaborated:
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, proof of cost differences justifies otherwise illegal price
discrimination; it does not negate the existence of the discrimination itself. So here, even if
the contribution differential were based on a sound and well-recognized business practice,
it would nevertheless be discriminatory, and the defendant would be forced to assert an
affirmative defense to escape liability.
Id. at 717 n.31 (citation omitted).
Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) and General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976), suggesting that cost containment is an acceptable rationale for excluding pregnancy benefits
from disability plans. These cases were legislatively overruled by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978. 42 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
42 435 U.S. at 717 n.32.
Representative Findley offered an amendment to the Equal Pay Act that would have ex-
pressly authorized a wage differential tied to the "ascertainable and specific added cost
resulting from employment of the opposite sex." He pointed out that the employment of
women might be more costly because of such matters as higher turnover and state laws
restricting women's hours. The Equal Pay Act's supporters responded that any cost differ-
ences could be handled by focusing on the factors other than sex which actually caused the
differences, such as absenteeism or number of hours worked. The amendment was rejected
as largely redundant for that reason. The Senate Report, on the other hand, does seem to
assume that the statute may recognize a very limited cost defense, based on 'all of the ele-
ments of the employment costs of both men and women.' It is difficult to find language in
1987]
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plied that a similar rejection should be read into Tide VII in wage equity
cases.
43
The Court further rejected the assertion that the Department's dis-
criminatory contribution scheme was justified by business necessity, i.e.,
that male employees would withdraw from the plan or the Department
itself if they were forced to subsidize the larger benefits paid to female
employees. Noting that there was no evidence of such withdrawals, the
Court concluded that "there has been no showing that sex distinctions
are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the Department's
retirement plan." 44
The Supreme Court therefore read Title VII to preclude an em-
ployer from justifying a discriminatory compensation scheme on cost
grounds.45 It is important to note, however, that even as the Court repu-
diated cost justification, it vacated the lower court's award of back pay to
the plaintiff class, instructing the court to reconsider it in light of the
Department's good faith reliance on the longstanding practice of using
gender based actuarial tables, and the potentially devastating impact of a
back pay award on the pension plan.46 This clear suggestion of a cost
defense on the question of remedy foreshadows subsequent judicial am-
bivalence towards imposing the financial burdens of compliance with Ti-
tle VII upon employers.
In any event, a reader of Manhart would come away thinking that
cost containment does not constitute adequate legal justification for any
practice which is violative of Title VII. Although Manhart itself was a
disparate treatment case (involving deliberately different treatment of men
and women), nothing in the Court's opinion limits its rejection of cost
defense to disparate treatment cases. 47 Nevertheless, a distinction has
the statute supporting even this limited defense; in any event, no defense based on the total
cost of employing men and women was attempted in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
43 See infra note 205.
44 435 U.S. at 716 n.30.
45 See also Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983), holding that Title VII is
violated when an employer offers its employees life annuities from a private insurance company that
pay women lower monthly retirement benefits than similarly situated men. The Court acted over the
dissenters' objection that the cost of providing unisex annuities "may become prohibitive" (citing
estimates for prospective benefit equalization of at least $85 million annually). Id. at 1095 n. I (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting); Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)
(striking down under Title VII a health insurance benefit plan which, by limiting pregnancy benefits
available to the wives of male employees, provided the latter with less dependent coverage than was
provided to female employees (whose husbands were covered for all conditions)). The Court reaf-
firmed that the cost of providing a complete package for all employees is not a justification "recog-
nized under Title VII once discrimination has been shown." Id. at 685 n.26.
46 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 721-22. Thus the "presumption in favor of retroactive [backpay, which]
can seldom be overcome," may be so overcome here. Id. at 716 n.30.
47 One treatise concludes: "Although it would be possible to argue that Manhart is a disparate
treatment case, and that the Court's rejection of a cost defense is relevant only to that theory, the
breadth of the language instead suggests a more general rejection of such an argument." C. SuLLi-
VAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 56
(1980) [hereinafter FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION]. The Manhart Court did allude
to the potential application of disparate impact analysis to fringe benefits when it dismissed the
Department's argument that a pension plan with gender neutral contributions would adversely im-
pact males, who will statistically receive less total benefits. The Court observed: "Even a completely
neutral practice will inevitably have some disproportionate impact on one group or another. Griggs
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evolved in the case law: cost justification has generally not upheld prac-
tices which are overtly discriminatory, but has with increasing frequency
succeeded where the challenged practice is neutral on its face but dis-
criminatory in its operation. The following sections will trace this
development.
B. Disparate Treatment Cases: The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ) Defense
An employer who engages in overt discrimination against a pro-
tected group (such as a refusal to consider females for a particular posi-
tion) is in violation of Title VII unless it can persuade the court that a
particular "religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that partic-
ular business or enterprise." 48 The decisional law has given this affirma-
tive defense a very narrow reading.49
Aside from the cases involving authenticity and privacy concerns, 50
the courts have generally required employers who seek to discriminate
against an entire group to demonstrate that the practice is necessary to
avoid a substantial loss in productivity, efficiency, or safety with regard to
a core function of the operation. 5' Under the prevailing standard the
employer must establish that "all or substantially all [group members]
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved,"'52 and that there are no "less discriminatory alternatives" to
does not imply, and this Court has never held, that discrimination must always be inferred from such
circumstances." 435 U.S. at 711 n.20.
48 Section 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). The BFOQ thus permits an employer to engage
in selection on the basis of group rather than individual attributes, and to discriminate on the
grounds of otherwise prohibited criteria. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAw 340-60 (2d ed. 1983); FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note
47, at 137-49; Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the BFOQ, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1025 (1977). It
should be noted that race and color are conspicuously absent from the BFOQ definition. Attempts
in the House and the Senate to amend this proposed section to include race were defeated. See
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 71 MicH. L. REv. 59, 82-83 (1972) (and legislative history citations contained therein).
49 As has been observed, "the legislative history indicates that this exception was intended to be
narrowly construed." Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969). In this
regard, it is important to note the unsuccessful attempt by Senator McClellan to amend the BFOQ
provision to permit racial considerations in employment "when the employer believes, on the basis
of substantial evidence, that the hiring of such an individual of a particular race... would be more
beneficial to the normal operations of his particular business or to its good will than the hiring of an
individual of another particular race." 110 CONG. REc. 13825 (1964) (discussed in Blumrosen, supra
note 48, at 83, and Sirota, supra note 48, at 1030). The amendment was defeated 30 to 61.
The major source of legislative intent is the Interpretive Memorandum submitted by the Bill's
Floor Managers. 110 CONG. REC. 7212 (1964). This Memorandum referred to the BFOQas a "lim-
ited exception," citing as examples "the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook, the
preference of a professional baseball team for male players, and the preference of a business which
seeks the patronage of members of particular religious groups for a salesman of that religion."
50 The classic uses of the BFOQ would permit a theatrical producer to exclude females from
consideration for the role of Macbeth, or a tennis club to exclude males from the job of women's
locker room attendant.
51 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 342-58.
52 See Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235. Some courts have adopted an even more stringent standard, hold-
ing that the BFOQ only applies to situations where the job requires a particular unique sex charac-
teristic, such as the position of wet nurse. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th
Cir. 1971).
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the group exclusion. 53
Many of the successful invocations of the BFOQ defense have oc-
curred in the context of jobs in public transportation. Courts recognize
the defense in this context because of the safety risks raised by unsatisfac-
tory performance and their direct relationship to the employer's busi-
ness.54 The courts have rejected BFOQ defenses, however, where the
asserted loss of productivity was in an area tangential to the essential
operations of the employer's business, such as the ability of flight cabin
attendants to perform the cosmetic functions of their job.55
53 See Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 730 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1984). Thus an employer
could not exclude women from the position of switchman on the mere assertion that the lifting tasks
were "too strenuous;" a strength test could be administered to determine qualified persons. Weeks,
408 F.2d 228. But Alabama prison authorities could bar females from contact positions in male
maximum security prisons where "the likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she
was a woman would pose a real threat not only to the victim of the assault but also to the basic
control of the penitentiary and protection of its inmates and the other security personnel. The em-
ployee's very womanhood would then directly undermine her capacity to provide the security that is
the essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-
36 (1977). Compare Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (The BFOQ could not be applied to exclude females from prison
guard positions where the conditions were not like the 'jungle atmosphere" in Alabama's
institutions.).
54 Thus airlines have defended policies grounding pregnant flight attendants on a showing that
the ability to perform emergency functions and protect passenger safety would be impaired (even
early in pregnancy) by the attendant's fatigue, nausea or possible miscarriage. See Levin v. Delta Air
Lines, 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980)
(en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) (reaching a similar result under business necessity analy-
sis); Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
The courts have been similarly sympathetic to passenger safety arguments in Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA") cases challenging age restrictions on initial employment of inter-
city bus drivers. (The ADEA borrows its BFOQ language from Title VII. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1)
(1982)). In both Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1122 (1975) and Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) the courts upheld
BFOQ defenses permitting the exclusion of all applicants above age 35 (over age 40 in Tamiami),
accepting the employers' evidence of the degenerative effects of aging beginning in the late 30's and
affecting driver safety. Compare Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982), striking down defendant's policy of excluding pilot applicants over
age 35 because the evidence "failed to show a relationship between a maximum age-at-hire limita-
tion and airline safety" and "failed to show the impossibility or impracticality of dealing with appli-
cants individually." 661 F.2d at 309.
Mandatory retirement age BFOQs have not fared as well in the courts, even where public safety
is involved. In Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985), plaintiffs were pilots disqualified
by the FAA's age 60 rule; they did not challenge their exclusion from the pilot position, but rather
the refusal of the airline to reassign them as flight engineers. The employer claimed an age BFOQ.
for the latter position as well as pilot, emphasizing that engineers are required to pilot the plane in
the event the pilot and copilot become incapacitated. The Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict
and judgment for plaintiffs, putting aside the airline's evidence supporting a BFOQ with the obser-
vation that "[e]ven in cases involving public safety, the ADEA plainly does not permit the trier of fact
to give complete deference to the employer's decision." 472 U.S. at 423. See also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. I 11 (1985), holding that age disqualified pilots were entitled to
full "bumping down" privileges to flight engineer jobs; Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more, 472 U.S. 353 (1985), reversing and remanding a decision approving a mandatory retirement
at age 55 for firefighters.
55 [T]he use of the word "necessary" in § 703(e) requires that we apply a business necessity test,
not a business convenience test. That is to say, discrimination based on sex is valid only when the
essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.
The primary function of an airline is to transport passengers safely from one point to another.
While a pleasant environment, enhanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that female stewardesses
provide as well, according to the finding of the trial court, their apparent ability to perform the non-
mechanical functions of the job in a more effective manner than most men, may all be important,
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Customer preference has generally been rejected as a justification
for group discrimination. In Diaz v. Pan American Airways, Inc. ,56 the air-
line argued that a survey of its customers indicating a seventy-nine per-
cent preference for female flight attendants supported its exclusion of
males from that position. In dismissing that contention, the Fifth Circuit
observed that "it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the pref-
erence and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very
prejudices the Act was meant to overcome."' 57 To the extent that disap-
pointment of the customer results in a loss of business volume, the em-
ployer must swallow this loss (unless it impairs its ability "to perform the
primary function or service it offers"58 ).
Perhaps the best example of the rejection of wealth maximization
(by catering to customer preference) as justification for overt discrimina-
tion is Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co..59 Southwest Airlines excluded
males from the positions of flight attendant and ticket agent. When this
practice was challenged in a Title VII class action, the airline claimed that
the BFOQ exception applied. The defense was that the females only hir-
ing policy was crucial to the airline's continued financial success, and
there was substantial evidence to support that assertion. Southwest had
begun operations with $143 in the bank and over $100,000 in debt. In
order to make it in a very competitive market the company retained an
advertising agency, which developed a marketing strategy that portrayed
Southwest as "the love airline." As the district court found:
Unabashed allusions to love and sex pervade all aspects of South-
west's public image. Its T.V. commercials feature attractive attendants
in fitted outfits, catering to male passengers while an alluring feminine
voice promises in-flight love. On board, attendants in hotpants ...
serve "love bites" (toasted almonds) and "love potions" (cocktails).
Even Southwest's ticketing system features a "quickie machine" to
provide "instant gratification." 60
In conformity with this image, Southwest employed only females in
the high customer contact positions, and their sex appeal was used to
attract male customers. "The evidence was undisputed that Southwest's
unique, feminized image played and continues to play an important role
in the airline's success."61 While the district court was "less certain" that
they are tangential to the essence of the business involved. No one has suggested that having male
stewards will so seriously affect the operation of an airline as to jeopardize or even minimize its
ability to provide safe transportation from one place to another.
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 389.
58 Id. Thus it has been suggested that Diaz leaves open the possibility that an employer could
establish a BFOQby showing that the exclusion of males (or females) was necessary to avoid "com-
plete business failure." See Sirota, supra note 48, at 1052-53. For a general discussion of the lack of
success of customer preference justifications, see id. at 1055-56.
59 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
60 Id at 294 n.4.
61 Id at 295. "From 1979 to 1980, the company's earnings rose from $17 million to $28 million
when most other airlines suffered heavy losses. As a percentage of revenues, Southwest's return is
considered to be one of the highest in the industry." Id at n.6.
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the females only hiring policy was essential to the continuation of this
image,62 it did find it "proper to infer from the airline's competitive suc-
cesses that Southwest's overall 'love image' has enhanced its ability to
attract passengers" and that "femininity and sex appeal are qualities re-
lated to successful job performance by Southwest's flight attendants and
ticket agents."63
Despite this showing the court held that the airline's discriminatory
hiring policy could not be justified by the BFOQ exception. Since males
were able to perform all the mechanical functions of the positions safely
and efficiently and since to hire them would not jeopardize the primary
function of the business, which is transportation, no BFOQ was appro-
priate.64 To Southwest's argument that its primary function is to make a
profit, the court responded:
Without doubt the goal of every business is to make a profit. For pur-
poses of BFOQ analysis, however, the business "essence" inquiry fo-
cuses on the particular service provided and the job tasks and
functions involved, not the business goal. If an employer could justify
employment discrimination merely on the grounds that it is necessary
to make a profit, Title VII would be nullified in short order.65
[A] potential loss of profits or possible loss of competitive advan-
tage following a shift to non-discriminatory hiring does not establish
business necessity .... 66 A rule prohibiting only financially successful
enterprises from discriminating under Title VII, while allowing their
less successful competitors to ignore the law, has no merit.6 7
62 Id. at 295.
63 Id. at 296.
64 Id. at 302. The court distinguished the situation of a business "where vicarious sex entertain-
ment is the primary service provided" or where "an established customer preference for one sex is
so strong that the business would be undermined if employees of the opposite sex were hired," Id at
302-03. To support this latter proposition the court cited Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 20 FEP Cases
1162 (C.D. Cal. 1979), upholding a males-only policy for the job of international marketing director
on the grounds that the foreign clients would not deal with a female in that job. Fernandez was
subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on grounds other than BFOQ holding that foreign prej-
udice against females in business cannot justify nonenforcement of Title VII. 653 F.2d 1273 (9th
Cir. 1981). Compare Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'don other
grounds 457 U.S. 176 (1982) ("acceptability to those persons with whom the company or branch does
business" is one factor to consider in determining whether executive position in American branch of
Japanese company can be restricted to Japanese national).
65 517 F. Supp. at 302 n.25.
66 Id. at 304. The court added that "Southwest, however, has failed to establish by competent
proof that revenue loss would result directly from hiring males.... [A]n employer's mere 'before-
hand belief' that sex discrimination is a financial imperative, alone, does not establish a BFOQ for
sex." Id (citation omitted).
67 Id. The district court also expressed concern about the slippery slope problem:
Southwest's position knows no principled limit. Recognition of a sex BFOQ for South-
west's public contact personnel based on the airline's "love" campaign opens the door for
other employers freely to discriminate by tacking on sex or sex appeal as a qualification for
any public contact position where customers preferred employees of a particular sex. In
order not to undermine Congress' purpose to prevent employers from "refusing to hire an
individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes," a BFOQ for sex must be
denied where sex is merely useful for attracting customers of the opposite sex, but where
hiring both sexes will not alter or undermine the essential function of the employer's
business.
Id. at 304. See also Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed,
460 U.S. 1074 (1983) (rejecting a BFOQ defense in a case challenging the employer's weight restric-
tions for flight attendants); Witt v. Secretary of Labor, 397 F. Supp. 673 (D. Me. 1975) (rejecting the
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Cost containment, like profit maximization, has been deemed an in-
adequate justification for exclusionary practices. Arguments relating to
the expenses necessary to provide facilities or housing for female work-
ers have thus been uniformly rejected as the basis for a males-only
BFOQ 68 Cost efficiency claims have met a similar fate. In Smallwood v.
UnitedAir Lines, Inc. ,69 for example, the employer sought to justify a maxi-
mum thirty-five age-at-hire policy by asserting that "there are substantial
costs involved in maintaining its pilot progression system, including a
significant investment in training" and "by insisting that new pilots be
under 35 years of age, the 'period of peak productivity' would be ex-
tended."' 70 The Fourth Circuit, while "impressed with United's overrid-
ing theme that hiring older pilots threatens it with burdensome
economic effects," nevertheless responded that "[e]conomic considera-
tions, however, cannot be the basis for a BFOQ. .... ,,71
In only one area of BFOQ doctrine does cost containment poten-
tially play some role, and that involves the feasibility of individualized (as
opposed to group) screening. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., the
Fifth Circuit suggested that an alternative method for establishing a
BFOQ exists "where an employer sustains its burden in demonstrating
that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with women on an indi-
vidualized basis .... 72 Although the Weeks court concluded that South-
ern Bell had failed to carry this burden,73 the concept was later applied
beauty salon owner's assertion that it was entitled to exclude females from consideration for the
position of hairdresser because of customer preference and the increased business a male operator
would generate). Where an individual employee's appearance and dress are directly related to the
employer's business success, reasonable gender neutral requirements may be imposed. See, e.g.,
Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 766 F.2d
1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285 (1986). Defendant television station's
standards of appearance for its on-air personnel can in a no way be considered discrimina-
tory per se. Both men and women were required to maintain a professional, business-like
appearance consistent with community standards. Since television is a visual medium...
such a reasonable requirement is obviously critical to defendant's economic well-being.
572 F. Supp. at 877.
68 See Sirota, supra note 48, at 1052-54 and cases collected therein. While the original EEOC
Guidelines permitted an employer to qualify for a BFOQif the expenses of providing separate facili-
ties was "clearly unreasonable", 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1965), this exception has been removed and
employer is now required to provide such facilities without regard to expense, and is no longer
entitled to a BFOQbased on expense. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1980). A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION § 17.00 (noting the "truism that a personal statutory right like that of freedom from job
discrimination is not ordinarily to be frustrated by an argument that granting that right will cause the
employer expense or inconvenience."). See B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 341 n.5.
69 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981).
70 Id at 307.
71 Id See also Mumane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 915 (1982) which upheld a maximum age-at-hire practice for pilots but eschewed any reliance
on the employer's argument "that the economy of the situation favors the hiring of younger Flight
Officers who ultimately will serve more years as Captains on American's airplanes.", id at 101 n.6;
Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1098 (5th Cir. 1981), rejecting the employer's
argument that its discriminatory reinstatement policy for teachers returning from maternity leave
was justified because the district "could not afford to bear the cost of keeping teachers on relief
status."
72 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969).
73 A strength test to determine lifting ability was an obvious alternative to blanket exclusion of
women. See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), af'd in part and
rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), where a specific finding was made by the district court that
it "is not practical or pragmatically possible for Colgate, in the operation of its plant, to assess the
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by the Fifth Circuit to justify a bus company's policy excluding persons
over age 40 from consideration for initial hire as intercity drivers. In
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 74 the court held that even though the
employer had not established that substantially all applicants over forty
were unable to drive buses safely, it had satisfied the court that "some
members of the discriminated against class possess a trait precluding safe
and efficient job performance [i.e. deterioration through the aging pro-
cess] that cannot be ascertained by means other than knowledge of the
applicant's membership in the class."' 75 Emphasizing that "the safe
transportation of bus passengers from one point to another" was the
very essence of the employer's business, 76 the court dismissed the gov-
ernment's assertion that "the physical examination, training program
and road test that all new drivers are subjected to were sufficient to
screen out those applicants of any age who would not be qualified to be
safe bus drivers." 77 "[W]hile chronological age could not be isolated as
a factor automatically indicating that an individual could not adjust to the
rigors of the [intercity driving] schedule, medical science could not accu-
rately separate chronological from functional or physiological age."78
Given this latter finding, the Fifth Circuit "did not have to consider
the problem of when, if ever, employer costs for individual screening
might make such screening 'impractical.' -79 The court did state, how-
ever, that it would not suffice for an employer merely to allege that indi-
vidualized screening would require "added expense."8' 0
The Tamiami approach has subsequently been noted with approval
by the Supreme Court;81 but employers have not had much success mak-
ing out such a defense.8 2
physical abilities and capabilities of each female who might seek a particular job, as a unique individ-
ual with a strength or stamina below or above average .... " 272 F. Supp. at 357. The Seventh
Circuit reversed, holding that Title VII mandates that each candidate be "afforded a reasonable
opportunity to demonstrate his or her ability to perform more strenuous jobs on a regular basis."
416 F.2d at 718.
74 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
75 Id. at 235.
76 Id. at 236.
77 Id. at 238.
78 Id. at 237. The validity of this conclusion has been questioned, since "the company continued
to employ over-40 drivers hired before that age, apparently determining their competence on an
individual basis [through recurring physicals]." FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 47, at 143. Compare Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (rejecting
employer's defense of impracticality of determining fitness of flight engineers over age 60).
79 FEDERAL LAw OF EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATrON, supra note 47, at 144 n.39 (emphasis added).
80 531 F.2d at 235 n.26. In this regard, see Rodriquez v. Taylor, 428 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D. Pa.
1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978), in which the court, rejecting the city's claim that all persons
over the age of41 could properly be excluded from hire as a security officer, observed that inexpensive
tests can be devised which could accurately determine whether a particular individual over 41 had
the physical and mental capacity for the position.
81 See Western Airlines, 472 U.S. 400 (There must be a showing by a preponderence of the evi-
dence that individual screening is highly impractical or impossible, and thus group exclusion is rea-
sonably necessary.).
82 In Diaz, for example, Pan Am persuaded the district court that while there are some males with
the characteristics necessary to meet the needs of airline passengers, "the actualities of the hiring
process would make it more difficult to find these few males;" thus, given "the present state of the
art of employment selection," to "eliminate the female sex qualification would simply eliminate the
best available tool for screening out applicants likely to be unsatisfactory and thus reduce the aver-
age level of performance." 442 F.2d at 387-88. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless rejected this applica-
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Clearly the BFOQ exception permitting overt discrimination against
an entire group has been narrowly constrained by the decisional law.8 3
Employers will be required to suffer loss of business through customer
dissatisfaction, or incur increased costs of accommodating or screening
females and older workers, rather than adopt financially attractive exclu-
sionary policies. Categorical exclusion is permitted only where it can be
shown that the unique characteristics of the group make the safe and
efficient performance of the job impossible, and further that the impair-
ment would jeopardize the core operations of the business. The em-
ployer is required to use "feasible" individualized selection devices
rather than resort to inexpensive group screening. All of this seems con-
sistent with, indeed mandated by, the goals of Tide VII. But when we
move from deliberate to "non-deliberate" discrimination, from treat-
ment to impact cases, we see a significantly different judicial response to
employer concerns about costs and profits.
C. Disparate Impact Cases
1. Reasonable Accommodation/Undue Hardship
In sharp contrast to the BFOQ area, cost containment plays a major
role in the defense of employment practices that interfere with religious
observance.
Tide VII, which originally included religion among the unlawful
grounds for decision making, was amended in 1972 to require employers
to "reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective em-
ployee's religious observance or practice" unless it can be demonstrated
that this would entail "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business."'8 4 The amendment is directed at situations involving a "neu-
tral rule of general applicability [which] conflicts with the religious prac-
tices of a particular employee,"85 in other words a case of unintended
disparate impact.8 6
tion of Weeks because the characteristics for which individual screening was allegedly impractical
related to "non-mechanical functions which we find to be tangential to what is 'reasonably necessary'
for the business involved .... Before sex discrimination can be practiced, it must not only be shown
that it is impracticable to find the men that possess the abilities that most women possess, but that
the abilities are necessary to the business, not merely tangential." 442 F.2d at 388-89. But see Levin v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (inability to predict which pregnant flight attend-
ants will suffer ailments justifies blanket exclusion of pregnant attendants from flight duty).
83 Indeed at least one court has found the BFOQ standard so restrictive of employer autonomy
that it has refused to apply it in the context of a fetal vulnerability program, opting instead for what
we will soon see is the more open ended business necessity analysis. See infra text accompanying
notes 185-96.
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). The legislative history is set out in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
85 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86 The duty to accommodate could have been developed from disparate impact analysis that
is available generally to Title VII plaintiffs. For example, a work schedule requiring Satur-
day and Sunday work would be neutral on its face but would have a disparate impact on
employees with religious beliefs that prohibit them from working of their Sabbath, be it
Saturday or Sunday. A showing of disparate impact would shift the burden of proof to the
employer to justify the work schedule as a business necessity. The employer might be able
to generally sustain its work schedule. But, if plaintiff could show that an alternative existed
which had a less drastic religious impact, pretext might be established so that the employer
19871
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Because both BFOQ and undue hardship are affirmative justifica-
tions for discriminatory conduct, one might expect that judicial interpre-
tation of the two would closely resemble each other. Yet in Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 87 the Supreme Court read the defense in reason-
able accommodation cases in such a way that the interests of the religious
observer are subordinated to the cost concerns of the employer.
Plaintiff Hardison, who was employed at TWA's maintenance base,
challenged his work schedule because it required him to report on Satur-
days, his Sabbath as a member of the Worldwide Church of God. The
base operated 24 hours a day, every day of the year. Because of his low
position on the seniority list, he could not bid out of Saturday work. 8
When he was unable to work out any accommodation with the employer
and union, Hardison was discharged for failure to report to work on
Saturdays.
Hardison had proposed several alternatives to a Saturday shift, each
of which would have required the employer to substitute another em-
ployee for him on that day. Concluding that these were reasonable ac-
commodations, the court of appeals held that TWA's refusal to adopt any
of them constituted a violation of Title VII. Justice Marshall expanded
on this point in his dissent:
Did TWA prove that it exhausted all reasonable accommodations,
and that the only remaining alternatives would have caused undue
hardship on TWA's business? To pose the question is to answer it, for
all that the District Court found TWA had done to accommodate re-
spondent's Sabbath observance was that it "held several meetings with
[respondent] . . . [and] authorized the union steward to search for
someone who would swap shifts." To conclude that TWA, one of the
largest air carriers in the Nation, would have suffered undue hardship
had it done anything more defies both reason and common sense.89
The majority of the Supreme Court, however, concluded that "each
of [the] suggested alternatives would have constituted an undue hardship
within the meaning of the statute .... -90 These accommodations would
have "caused other shop functions to suffer," or "involved premium
overtime pay," or "involved a breach of the seniority provisions of the
contract." 9' "It was essential to TWA's business to require Saturday and
Sunday work from at least a few employees," 92 and thus "TWA had done
all that it could to accommodate Hardison's religious beliefs without in-
curring substantial costs or violating the seniority rights of other employ-
ees." 93 "To require TWA to bear more than a de minimus cost in order
would still be required to make an individual exception to the generally applicable work
schedule.
FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 47, at 165.
87 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
88 Hardison had had sufficient seniority in his original department to get his shift preference.
He decided, however, to transfer to a different department, where he began at the bottom of the
seniority ladder.
89 432 U.S. at 91.
90 Id. at 77.
91 Id. at 76-77.
92 Id. at 80.
93 Id. at 83 n.14.
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to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship." 94 Responding to
the dissent's assertion that the cost of accommodation would have been
minimal, the Court alluded to "the likelihood that a company as large as
TWA may have many employees whose religious observances, like Hardi-
son's, prohibit them from working on Saturdays or Sundays." 95
While there are constitutional96 and statutory97 complications with
the comparison, it is noteworthy to contrast the Hardison undue hardship
cost defense (premised on the out-of-pocket expenses needed to accom-
modate certain employees 98) with the rejection of such a defense in the
94 Il at 84. As one Treatise has observed: "Given the size of the airline and the kinds of costs
apparently involved in Hardison, it would appear that the de minimus standard is dose to an absolute
standard." B. SCHLEi & P. GROSSM-M, supra note 48, at 235 n.73.
95 432 U.S. at 84 n.15. This allusion seems to suggest that undue hardship can be made out by
anticipated, as well as actual present, hardship. See generally B. SCHLEi & P. GRossmAN, supra note 48,
at 224 n.57, contrasting this notion with the EEOC Guidelines, which take the position that "[a]
mere assumption that many more people, with the same religious practices as the person being
accommodated, may also need accommodation is not evidence of undue hardship." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.2(c)(1) (1980).
The Court has recently held that an employer satisfies the § 701(j) obligation if it shows that the
employee was offered any reasonable accommodation, and that there is no duty to accept the em-
ployee's proposal merely because it involves no undue hardship. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook,
107 S. Ct. 367 (1986). The Court reaffirmed its reading that § 701j) does "not impose a duty on the
employer to accommodate at all costs." Id. at 373.
96 There are "important constitutional questions [respecting the establishment clause of the
First Amendment] that would be posed by interpreting the law to compel employers (or fellow em-
ployees) to incur substantial costs to aid the religious observer." Hardison, 432 U.S. at 90 n.3 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). In the Court's view, "[i]t would be anomalous to conclude that by 'reasonable
accommodation' Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preferences of some
employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the
religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not require an employer to go that
far." IdL at 81. The dissent thus reserved judgment on the abstract issue ofjust "how much cost an
employer must bear before he incurs 'undue hardship.'" Id. The reasonable accommoda-
tion/establishment clause issue was aired in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir.
1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 903 (1977). It
is interesting to compare the Court's rejection of preferential treatment here with its qualified ac-
ceptance in other areas of Title VII doctrine. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l v. EEOC, 106 S.
Ct. 3019 (1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
97 Any accommodation that would interfere with seniority rights of other employees conflicts,
the Court noted, with the special protection accorded such rights by Title VII and Supreme Court
precedent. 432 U.S. at 81. "[A]bsent discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system
cannot be an unlawful practice even if the system has some discriminatory consequences." Id. at 82.
See also Brodin, supra note 16.
98 The EEOC Guidelines, revised after Hardison, adopt a comparative approach to the determi-
nation of undue hardship. They provide that "due regard [will be] given to the identifiable cost in
relation to the size and operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals who will in
fact need a particular accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1980). The Guidelines go on to
provide that the regular payment of premium wages for substitute workers can constitute undue
hardship, but that the Commission "will presume that infrequent payment of premium wages for a
substitute or the payment of premium wages while a more permanent accommodation is being
sought are costs which an employer can be required to bear as a means of providing a reasonable
accommodation" and that "administrative costs necessary for an accommodation will not constitute
more than a de minimis cost." Id. See generally B. ScHL & P. GRoSSMAN, supra note 48, at 235. See
also Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902-03 ("The term reasonable accommodation is a rela-
tive term and cannot be given a hard and fast meaning. Each case involving such a determination
necessarily depends upon its own facts and circumstances, and comes down to a determination of
.reasonableness' under the unique circumstances of the individual employer-employee relation-
ship.").
For cases in which the employer was required to bear costs of accommodation, see Brown v.
General Motors Corp., 601 F. 2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979) (employer could not justify discharging plaintiff
who, due to religious beliefs, refused to work a Friday evening shift, where employee could have
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disparate treatment cases discussed above. Hardison requires the em-
ployer to make Only minimal expenditures in order to avoid discrimina-
tion against religious observers, while the BFOQ cases place a
significantly greater financial burden on employers to provide equal
opportunity. 99
An explanation for the judicial deference to employer cost concerns
in reasonable accommodation cases may lie in the different nature of the
discrimination involved, and in the number of persons affected. BFOQ
cases involve direct and deliberate exclusion of entire groups. In cases
like Hardison, on the other hand, no discriminatory purpose is attributed
to the employer; and the number of employees adversely affected is likely
to be relatively small.' 00 Hardison seems to reflect a judicial inclination to
been accommodated without extra costs and with only de minimus efficiency problems, since there
was an available replacement.); Minkus v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 600 F.2d 80 (7th Cir. 1979)
(employer could not justify refusal to accommodate Sabbatarian who could not take Saturday test on
the basis of the cost of preparing a second test, when employer had not considered lesser cost of
sequestering.). For cases in which the employer was not required to bear the costs of accommoda-
tion, see Wren v. T.I.M.E.-DC Inc., 595 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979) (employer need not use a replace-
ment driver to accommodate driver's religious beliefs where that would mean incurring costs to
locate a replacement and possible loss from cancellation of runs when replacement could not be
found.); Smith v. United Ref. Co., 21 FEP 1481 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (employer established that a day's
delay in shutting down refinery, caused by unauthorized absence of supervisor who attended reli-
gious meeting, cost $30,000 in losses, which constituted undue hardship.).
99 The Supreme Court has adopted a similarly narrow view of the reasonable accommodations
required of employers for handicapped persons under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, where neither
first amendment nor seniority concerns exist. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397 (1979), holding that nursing education program did not have to make modifications re-
quested by an applicant with serious hearing disability, like providing close individual supervision
and dispensing with certain courses, because they constituted "fundamental alterations" going far
beyond what statute requires. Id. at 410. Accommodations would only have to be made for a partic-
ular handicap if they imposed no "undue financial hardship [or] administrative burden." Id. at 412.
It has been suggested that the "college's reluctance to devise a special program for Ms. Davis was
probably based [not on public safety but] on efficiency; it undoubtedly would cost more to tailor its
program to Ms. Davis' special needs." See McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 24, at 1042.
Administrative regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act require reasonable accommo-
dation "unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship." To determine whether the latter is the case, the department will consider the overall size of
the program, the type of enterprise, and the nature and cost of the accommodation. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.12(c) (1985 Dep't of Educ.). For cases balancing the costs and benefits of accommodation, see
Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985) (holding that the employer was required to bear the cost of readers
and electronic devices to assist blind employees because the modest costs of such accommodation
were outweighed by the social costs of excluding blind workers); Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that the Oakland Unified School District was not required to provide an
aide to a blind applicant for an administrative position); OFCCP v. Texas Indus., Inc., N. 80-OFCCP-
28 (Dep't of Labor, 1980) (noted in B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 289) (employer did
not have to accommodate cement truck driver by providing him a helper for heavy lifting since that
would involve a substantial modification of the job and would impose a significant financial cost).
100 As has been observed: "The accommodation requirement differs from Griggs in terms of the
degree to which claims of discrimination can be handled on an aggregate basis. The consequence
test of Griggs flowed from recognition of the facts that racial discrimination is directed toward a class
and that the most effective remedies eliminate unnecessary employment barriers for the class as a
whole. These remedies attack patterns of discrimination, identified through use of statistical evi-
dence. The accommodation standard, in contrast, does not apply an aggregate analysis, presumably
because the diverse and myriad practices of religious groups defy generalized statistical description.
The standard requires courts to weigh the impact of specific employment policies on a specific indi-
vidual's religious practices and to fashion an individual remedy. Thus, the accommodation standard
identifies the victims of employment discrimination in terms of individuals, not classes." See Note,
Accommodation of an Employee's Religious Practice Under Title VII, 1976 ILL. L.F. 867, 871.
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require the blameworthy employer (like Southwest Airlines) 0 1 to pay a
bigger price for its transgression than the "innocent" employer whose
neutral rule causes adverse effect; and to balance the magnitude of the
violation, measured by the size of the group harmed, against the cost to
the employer of avoiding discrimination. A look at the development of
the cost defense in disparate impact litigation appears to confirm this
hypothesis.
2. Business Necessity
Unlike BFOQand undue hardship, the business necessity defense in
disparate impact litigation is a wholly judge made concept, drawn from
no specific statutory language or provision. 10 2 As such, it has developed
into an amorphous and imprecise component of Tide VII doctrine.' 03
Over time, a cost containment dimension has crept into the business ne-
cessity concept, pulling it far from its original moorings in the Griggs
decision.
a. Griggs and the Early Decisional Law
The origin of Tide VII's overriding importance as a business regula-
tory scheme can be traced to the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 104
That case transformed the statute from a law forbidding only purposeful
discrimination to one which forbids facially neutral practices which have
an unintentional adverse effect. ' 0 5 At the same time, Griggs contained the
seeds of the cost justification which is the subject of this article.
Griggs presented the Supreme Court with a typical workplace scena-
rio. The employer, in an effort ostensibly designed to "improve the
overall quality of the work force,"' 10 6 adopted a requirement for hire or
transfer into an operating department that the applicant possess a high
school diploma or pass a general intelligence test. Although there was
"no showing of a discriminatory purpose in the adoption of the diploma
and test requirements .... ,,107 they "operated to render ineligible a
101 See supra text accompanying notes 59-67.
102 The term "common law legislation" has been used to describe statutes which give the judici-
ary "broad mandates to act as policy makers." See Van Valkenberg, Law Teachers, Law Students, and
Litigation, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 584 (1984). Tide VII may be so described. The Act does not define
with any precision the "discrimination" that it makes unlawful, leaving it for judges to construct
theories of liability and defense.
103 The open-ended nature of the business necessity defense has generated a considerable litera-
ture. See, e.g., Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L.
REV. 376 (1981); Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46
U. Cm. L. REV. 911 (1979); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-
Alternative Approach, 84 YALE LJ. 98 (1974).
104 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, supra note 48; Brest, The Supreme Court 1975
Term-Forward" In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HAv. L. REV. 1, 22-54 (1976); Brodin,
supra note 16, at 955-59.
105 See Fiss, supra note 2, at 237-49.
106 401 U.S. at 431.
107 Id. at 428. Prior to the effective date of Tide VII, Duke Power had "openly discriminated on
the basis of race in the hiring and assigning of employees at [the plant in question]." Id. at 427. By
formal policy, black employees were restricted to the maintenance department. This policy was
abandoned in 1965, when Tide VII became effective, and the diploma and test requirements were
put in its place. The latter criteria had an exclusionary result similar to the former overt segregation.
The extent to which the Court's adoption of disparate impact theory may in some sense have been a
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markedly disproportionate number of Negroes ..... 108 The require-
ments were adopted "without meaningful study of their relationship to
job-performance ability" and neither requirement was "shown to bear a
demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which it was used." 10 9
Writing for a unanimous Court, ChiefJustice Burger read Title VII
to mandate the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone
is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to ex-
clude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited.
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built
in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability... [because] Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. 110
Thus Duke Power Company had violated Title VII by using selection
devices with disparate impact and no job relation.
As with so many Supreme Court decisions that break new legal
ground, however, there was precious little guidance in Griggs as to how
the no-fault theory of discrimination would actually operate. Most im-
portant for present purposes, the Court was sketchy as to what consti-
tutes sufficient justification for a practice that adversely affects a
protected group. 11 Griggs mandated that an employer seeking to use
such screening devices must bear the administrative cost of "meaningful
study" of their relation to the job to be performed. Employers can im-
plement the devices only if they are predictive ofjob performance. Once
this is established, the device can be used because the employer need not
bear the cost of employing unproductive workers. 112
response to the difficulty of proving discriminatory purpose is a question about which we can only
speculate.
108 Id. at 429. The showing of disproportionate impact was based on general statistics relating to
possession of a high school diploma and success on the intelligence test rather than specific appli-
cant flow figures for the Duke Power Company. Id. at 430 n.6.
109 Id. at 431.
110 Id. at 431-32. In so holding, the Court adopted a view of the fair employment principle that
had been suggested by several scholars. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598
(1969); Fiss, supra note 2 (if a selection device excludes disproportionate numbers of minorities but
does not operate to improve productivity or performance, then the device is the "functional
equivalent of race" and should be prohibited.).
The Griggs principle finds considerable support in the language of the Act--Congress cast its net
broadly when it prohibited practices that "in any way... deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
111 This has left the lower courts "a considerable degree of freedom in shaping the contours of
the defense." See Comment, supra note 103, at 912.
112 Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better quali-
fied simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such,
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Subsequent decisions have elaborated on the job relation defense as
applied to scored testing devices. They place a heavy burden on the em-
ployer who seeks to use such devices. In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,' 13
the Court adopted the validation requirements used by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, which insisted on a precise empiri-
cal demonstration that the test is "predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant
to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated."'1 14 In so
doing the Court cast aside the objection that it was requiring "an impos-
sibly expensive and complex validation study" which would discourage
employers from giving objective tests. 115 The Court held further that
even "[i]f an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its
tests are 'job-related,' it remains open to the complaining party to show
that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial
effect, would also serve the employer's interest in 'efficient and trustwor-
thy workmanship.' "116
The Supreme Court has similarly required employers utilizing
screening devices other than tests to statistically validate those devices
when they disadvantage protected groups. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,117 for
example, the employer's minimum height/weight requirements for
Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nation-
ality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is that any tests used
must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.
401 U.S. at 436.
113 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
114 Id at 431 (quoting the EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607A(c)).
115 422 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring in thejudgment). The validation process requires
the employer to retain an expert, undertake ajob analysis, gather test and job performance data, and
apply an accepted validation technique. See generally FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRiMINATiON,
supra note 47, at § 2.2; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 80-161.
As one court has recently put it, the "proof of the job relatedness of facially neutral but racially
significantjob criteria is frequently an arduous task, involving expert testimony and nationwide stud-
ies and reports." Bunch v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 393 n.10 (5th Cir. 1986). Some have questioned
whether employers of all sizes should be required to absorb these costs, and have suggested that
they may encourage employers to abandon objective testing. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
463 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
116 422 U.S. at 425. Ironically, the language and legislative history of § 703(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2h (1982), which exempts from the Act's prohibitions "professionally developed ability
test[s]" that are "not designed, intended or used to discriminate," would appear to argue against the
imposition of such no-fault validation requirements. See Brodin, supra note 16, at 947-52; Wilson, A
Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the
Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REv. 844 (1972). Nevertheless, the Court has reaffirmed the employer's
obligation to prove empirically that a test with disparate impact is job related. See Teal, 457 U.S. at
451-52.
New EEOC Uniform Guidelines adopted in 1978, 29 C.R.F. § 1607, have loosened somewhat
the standards for validation which Albemarle incorporated. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 48, at 92-97. Also, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), a non-Title VII challenge to
a written test used to select police recruits, refused to apply strict validation requirements and up-
held the examination merely on a showing of a "direct relationship between performance on Test 21
and perfomance on the policeman's job." 426 U.S. at 249-50. While the Court has not explicitly
diluted validation requirements in a Title VII action, "the Court appeared to extend its acceptance
of training success as an appropriate criterion to the Title VII arena by its affirmance, albeit without
opinion, of United States v. South Carolina 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977) (three judge panel),
aff'd without opinion sub nom., National Educ. Ass'n. v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978)." B.
SCHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 127.
117 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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prison guard positions excluded virtually all females from consideration.
Defendants contended that the requirements were job related because
they "have a relationship to strength, a sufficient but unspecified amount
of which is essential to effective job performance as a correctional coun-
selor." 118 The Court, however, held that the lack of empirical evidence
was fatal to the defense. It added:
If the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona fide,
their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test for
applicants that measures strength directly. Such a test, fairly adminis-
tered, would fully satisfy the standards of Title VII because it would be
one that "measure[s] the person for the job and not the person in the
abstract." 119
Thus the prison authorities would have to incur the costs of devising,
validating, and administering a test, rather than inexpensively measuring
applicants against a height/weight chart.
In its Griggs decision, however, the Court used the term business ne-
cessity interchangeably with the concept of job relatedness. It was left
unexplained whether business necessity, described as the "touchstone"
of Title VII, 120 is a separate form of justification, or merely another de-
scriptive phrase for job relation. The Griggs decision unfortunately did
not "give any clue as to the relationship, or indeed the difference, if any,
between 'job relatedness' and 'business necessity,' a question which has
been the subject of varied and wideranging opinion by the lower
courts."' 12 1 While the job relation defense has been substantially clarified
by the Court in decisions like Albermarle, little attention has been paid to
the contours of business necessity.
The potential distinction between job relation and business neces-
sity was raised in Johnson v. Pike Corp. 122 In Johnson, the plaintiff chal-
lenged the employer's rule that required discharge of any worker who
was subjected to successive wage garnishments by his creditors. The rule
was found to have a discriminatory effect on minorities and thus the
question became one of justification. Pike argued that the rule consti-
tuted a business necessity because of the time and expense involved
when the company had to administer employee garnishments.' 23 In re-
jecting this defense, the district court held that the "sole permissible rea-
son for discriminating against actual or prospective employees involves
the individual's capability to perform the job effectively. This approach
leaves no room for arguments regarding inconvenience, annoyance or
118 Id. at 331.
119 Id. at 332 (citation omitted).
120 401 U.S. at 431. It has been observed that "the business necessity doctrine thus adopted in
Griggs appears in neither the explicit language nor the legislative history of the 1964 Act." Note, 84
YALE LJ., supra note 103, at 98 (citing Wilson, supra note 116 at 854 n.62).
121 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 92, 113.
122 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
123 Specifically, the employer pointed to "the expense and time attendant to responding to at-
tachments and garnishments by various sections of the company's management and clerical staffs,"
and the "annoyance and time involved in answering letters and telephone calls from its employees'
creditors .... Id. at 495.
[Vol. 62:318
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
even expense to the employer."' 124 Such costs were the price that Con-
gress required employers to pay to end discrimination. 125 In the court's
view, the defendant would have to demonstrate that employees became
unproductive as a result of successive garnishments in order to make out
a valid defense to a showing of disparate impact. "The ability of the indi-
vidual effectively and efficiently to carry out his assigned duties is, there-
fore, the only justification recognized by the law."' 126 For the Johnson
court, business necessity occupied a universe no larger than job
relation. 127
Other lower court decisions rendered in the years immediately fol-
lowing Griggs evidenced a similar lack of sympathy towards employers'
efforts to minimize costs. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,128 for exam-
ple, involved a challenge to a no transfer policy which had the effect of
locking blacks into intracity driving jobs to which they had been previ-
ously discriminatorily assigned. Choice intercity routes were reserved
for whites. Among the reasons advanced by the company to support the
policy was the cost of training intracity drivers to work as intercity driv-
ers. The court held that the employer had not made a showing that its
policy was "necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business,"
and thus fell short of demonstrating business necessity."' 12 9 With regard
to the attempt at a cost defense, the Tenth Circuit wrote:
124 Id.
125 In passing the 1964 Act, Congress was fully aware that putting an end to racially discrimi-
natory employment practices would place a burden on employers in terms of their time,
inconvenience and expense.... It may seem unfair that the employer should be made to
suffer for the discrimination practiced by others [in seeking disproportionate numbers of
garnishments against minorities]. But this was the price Congress determined necessary to
end discrimination.... [Ilf the employer were permitted to discharge an employee because
it cost a little more to attend to the clerical work when his wages are garnished, the effort to
end discrimination would fail. Racial discrimination in employment cannot be tolerated,
the expense or inconvenience in complying with the law notwithstanding.
Id. at 496.
126 Id. "If [an employee] is an unproductive worker, he may be terminated because he is unpro-
ductive, but not for a supposedly causal relationship which has the effect of being racially discrimina-
tory." Id. at 495. The court found no correlation in the record between wage garnishment and work
efficiency. Id. Indeed it observed that the garnishment rule deprived the employer of "an otherwise
capable employee," requiring the company to "expend considerable time and effort to train a re-
placement." Id. at 496. See also Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974), indicat-
ing in a similar case that the employer "must at least prove that its garnishment policy fosters
employee productivity."
127 The district court, noting that Griggs did not answer the "question whether business necessity
includes expense and inconvenience to the employer," concluded:
While there may be in many situations a clear distinction between business necessity relat-
ing to job capability and business necessity relating to the employer's expense and incon-
venience, it is submitted that the Court in Griggs intended the definition therein outlined to
be exclusive. The Court liberally construed Title VII in order to implement the congres-
sional directive that members of minority groups be insured equal opportunity in employ-
ment. All attempts to depart from this mandate must be carefully scrutinized.
332 F. Supp. at 495. Johnson has been criticized in some of the literature. See, e.g., Casenote, Johnson
v. Pike Corp., 85 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 (1972) ("[T]he court's conclusion that the business
necessity defense is available only when an employment practice measures the employee's ability to
carry out his assigned duties.., rests on an unnecessarily broad reading of the Griggs opinion.").
128 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). Jones came down before the
Supreme Court pronouncement in Griggs but followed lower court precedent adopting impact
theory.
129 Id. at 249.
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The training costs are somewhat illusory. To fill a line driver va-
cancy with a new hire rather than a transferee will entail as much train-
ing if not more because a transferee has some knowledge of company
policy and procedure. The training of a new city driver to replace the
transferee will entail some costs, but we believe that these would not
be substantial enough to outweigh the detriment to the plaintiffs of
permanently locking them in city drivers jobs.' 30
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. 131 struck a similar chord. Plaintiffs chal-
lenged a departmental seniority system which, because of prior discrimi-
nation in assignments, had the effect of freezing blacks into inferior jobs.
Lorillard asserted that its seniority system was dictated by business ne-
cessity, specifically that it had been compelled to adopt the system at the
threat of a strike by the union, and that it would foster "[e]fficiency,
[e]conomy and [m]orale."' 132 In affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, the
Fourth Circuit held that
[a]voidance of union pressure.., fails to constitute a legitimate busi-
ness purpose which can override the adverse racial impact of an other-
wise unlawful employment practice. .. . Despite the fact that a strike
over a contract provision may impose economic costs, if a discrimina-
tory contract provision is acceded to the bargainee as well as the bar-
gainor will be held liable. 133
The court elaborated: "While considerations of economy and efficiency
will often be relevant to determining the existence of business necessity,
dollar cost alone is not determinative."'' 34 It concluded by recognizing
that while "some additional administrative costs may be imposed ... to
eliminate discrimination, avoidance of the expense is not a business pur-
130 Id. at 250. See also United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 366 (8th Cir. 1973),
rejecting a similar defense based on training costs; United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,
464 F.2d 301, 310-11 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973), requiring the employer to
set up an extensive retraining program to give porters the opportunity to qualify as brakemen.
131 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
132 Id. at 799.
133 Id. at 799.
134 Id. at 799 n.8. As to the efficiency argument, the court was unpersuaded that the seniority
progression system was consistent with maintaining maximum productivity, and suggested that alter-
natives existed (such as permitting each employee to establish "his capacity to handle the job") that
carried less adverse impact. Id. at 799-800. The court wrote:
[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adher-
ing to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate busi-
ness purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial
impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged
to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which
would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with
a lesser differential racial impact.
444 F.2d at 798. The court added: "It should go without saying that a practice is hardly 'necessary'
if an alternative practice better effectuates the intended purpose or is equally effective but less dis-
criminatory." Id. at 798 n.7.
The Robinson formulation of the business necessity standard has been widely adopted, including
its "less discriminatory alternative" component. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
446 F.2d 652, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1971); cases collected in Note, supra note 9, at 398-400. It has been
noted that the "lesser discriminatory alternatives component of the disparate impact analysis pro-
vides the courts with an essential tool whereby they can maximize the implementation of the equal
opportunity goal while simultaneously preserving all truly necessary and efficient business prac-
tices." Id. at 399 (footnote omitted).
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pose that will validate an otherwise unlawful employment practice."135
The distinction between justification based on lost productivity and
that based on cost saving was drawn again in Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc. ,136
which involved the shutdown of defendant's footwear division and a lay-
off/bumping practice that had an adverse effect on female workers. Uni-
royal's defense focused on the expense that would be required to train
employees for new positions rather than bump senior employees down
into those positions. The court estimated the cost at $600,000, but nev-
ertheless rejected this defense, holding that "dollar cost alone is an im-
material consideration under the business necessity doctrine, except
when expenditures of monies may curtail operations to the extent that
incumbent employees may lose their jobs."'13 7
Business necessity was thus narrowly construed in the years follow-
ing Griggs. The courts made it clear that the existence of a valid business
purpose, such as cost containment, was not enough to support a practice
which operated to exclude disproportionate numbers of minorities or
women.138 Instead, "this doctrine of business necessity 'connotes an ir-
resistible demand.' The system in question must not only foster safety
and efficiency, but must be essential to that goal.... In other words, there
must be no acceptable alternative that will accomplish that goal 'equally
well with a lesser differential racial impact.' "'9 This tight formulation
of business necessity paralleled BFOQ doctrine, both representing af-
firmative defenses for policies which violate the equal opportunity princi-
ple, either directly or indirectly. The inclusion of a cost justification in
either defense was no doubt viewed by the courts as an unacceptable
threat to the integrity of that principle.
135 444 F.2d at 800. Schlei & Grossman state that Robinson
appears to establish a balancing test-the impairment of the safe and efficient operation of
the business weighed against the racial impact. The problem is how to strike the balance.
For example, if the Robinson test were to be applied to the situation in Johnson, the result is
not clear. If the employer can show evidence that the discharge rule saves costs by reducing
the administrative expense in handling garnishments, the amount of costs saved must
somehow be weighed against the racial impact. While the balance is easy to state-the
higher the costs and the lower the amount of racial or gender impact, the more likely a
court is to find business necessity-it is impossible to provide a more predictive rule where
an employer's cost savings are at issue.
B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 55.
136 458 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
137 Id. at 271. The court did entertain Uniroyal's alternative theory, that the mass bumping re-
quired by a nondiscriminatory system might cause severe loss of productivity and thus sales, and
suggested that upon a proper evidentiary showing this could constitute business necessity. Id. at
272-73. See also Ruckel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 14 FEP Cases 403 (N.D. Ind. 1976), holding that the
challenged practice of hiring persons known to be qualified rather than checking individual qualifica-
tions "may have been efficient in that it saved time and search costs" but was not "essential to the
safe, efficient operation of the business." Id. at 411.
138 The business purpose standard has been uniformly rejected. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d at 798;Jnes v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F.2d at 249; cases collected in Note, supra note
103, 84 YALE LJ. at 100 n.13, 14. Such a standard comports more with a subjective intent theory of
liability (i.e., the notion that the existence of a business purpose negates discriminatory intent) than
with disparate impact (where the key question is whether the exclusionary effect of a practice can be
tolerated because the practice produces a more productive workforce.).
139 United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d at 308 (citations omitted, emphasis in
orignal).
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b. The Emergence of the Cost Defense-The Public Safety Cases
Recent years have seen an expansion of the concept of business ne-
cessity to include a cost containment dimension.' 40 This evolution has
occurred during a period in which the Supreme Court's commitment to
the disparate impact principle has been questioned, 14 1 and American
business has come under substantial pressures to cut labor and related
costs. 142
The judicial equation of cost containment with business necessity
can be traced to a line of cases involving screening devices other than
objective tests 143 and in situations which affect public health and
safety.' 44 Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc. 145 illustrates the phenomenon.
Paul Spurlock, a black man, brought a disparate impact challenge to
two of United's pre-employment requirements for entry into its flight of-
140 For a general treatment of the business necessity doctrine, see Contreras v. City of Los Ange-
les, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (analyzing the develop-
ment of conflicting standards of business necessity); FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATiON,
supra note 47, § 1.5; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 102-90; Note, supra note 9, at 376;
Comment, supra note 103; Note, supra note 103, 84 YALE LJ. 98. Initially the question had to be
resolved as to whether job relatedness and business necessity were the same or different concepts.
The courts have generally resolved this by applying the job relation standard to tests and similar
screening devices which focus on specific jobs, and business necessity to practices which are broader
in perspective. See Note, supra note 9, at 387-89. There then emerged three main areas of uncer-
tainty in the lower courts' efforts to develop a workable rule: What factors are sufficiently legitimate
to override the prima facie showing of disproportionate impact; the magnitude of the burden placed
upon the employer to establish a legitimate business purpose; and "whether the employer should be
required to adopt the least discriminatory alternative employment practice which would meet the
legitimate needs of his business." Id. at 387.
141 One writer has aptly observed:
While Griggs was a landmark case in the development of fair employment law under Title
VII, it was decided during a period of rapid and substantial change in the membership and
character of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court's subsequent decisions have
failed either to maintain or extend the strict analysis foreshadowed by Griggs. Indeed, the
Court appears to have made a concerted effort to repudiate the philosophical underpin-
nings of the Griggs holding while struggling to forge its own consensus of the proper analy-
sis to be employed under Title VII. The result, as one of the Justices has described it, has
been a 'meandering course [for] Title VII adjudication.' Unable to reach a consensus on
the appropriate standard under Title VII, the Court has handed down decisions in the dec-
ade since Griggs that have raised more questions than they have resolved. Consequently,
both the status of the law under Title VII and the continuing viability of Griggs are in a
substantial state of uncertainty.
Id. at 400 (citations omitted).
142 See Briscoe, Strategic Human Resources Decision-making An Economic Lesson, 21 HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 2 (1982) ("During economic downturns, the name of the game for many American
business firms is survival. As inventories pile up, prices often soften and organizations adjust by
Icutting [personnel] costs.' " The article criticizes the practice of treating the "substantial costs" of
recruitment, selection, training and development of personnel as expenses to cut, rather than as an
investment in the company's future.); Big Business Deserts the Democrats, THE NATION, July 5, 1986, at 1
("In a variety of ways sagging growth and profits at home and increased competition abroad made
the business community more cost-sensitive."); The Average Guy Takes It In The Chin, New York Times,
July 13, 1986, at § 3, p.1, col. 2 (noting the "cost-cutting trend" in wages); The Ax Falls on Equal
Opportunity, New York Times, January 4, 1987, at § 3. p.2 7 ("If you think of equity and efficiency as
major concerns in corporations, and you think of a pendulum swinging between the two, you realize
that what is happening now is that the pendulum is swinging toward efficiency.").
143 For a discussion of the requirement for empirical demonstration ofjob relation see supra note
115 and accompanying text.
144 Reliance upon public safety as a basis for creating exceptions to individual rights doctrine is of
course not unique to Title VII. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing a
"public safety" exception to the Miranda rule).
145 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973).
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ficer training program. At the time of application he possessed a com-
mercial pilot's license and was between twenty-one and twenty-nine years
of age. He did not, however, have a college degree or the minimum of
five hundred hours flight time which United also required; rather, he had
completed only two years of college and only 204 hours of flight time. 146
Given "the minuscule number of black flight officers in United's em-
ploy" (nine out of five thousand nine hundred) 147 the district and circuit
courts held that Spurlock had established a prima facie case of dispropor-
tionate impact. 148 Both courts went on to conclude, however, that
United had met its burden of demonstrating that the challenged qualifi-
cations were job related. 149 The district court relied on "[s]tatistical
studies made by United [which] establish that there is indeed a direct and
substantial correlation between successful completion of the training
program and a college degree, especially when that degree is in science
related areas" and which "demonstrate a close correlation between flight
time and the quality of flight time and success in job performance."' 150
The only study set out in the opinion, however, compared the number of
flight hours of trainees with their failure rate in the training program, 151
and demonstrated something of correlation (but far from a straight line
correspondence) between increased hours and increased success.' 5 2
Nothing in the opinion cited any empirical evidence of a relationship be-
tween pre-employment requirements and performance on the job.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit observed that United
does not train applicants but instead requires them to be pilots at the
time of their application; applicants who have more flight hours are more
likely to succeed in the training program; and the statistics showed that
five hundred hours was a reasonable minimum to require of applicants to
insure their ability to pass United's training program. The court added:
"The evidence also showed that because of the high cost of the training
program, it is important to United that those who begin its training pro-
gram eventually become flight officers. This is an example of business
146 The district court found that United's recruiting brochure, which Spurlock had relied upon,
listed as qualifications a commercial pilot's license, two years of college, and between 165 to 200
flying hours. 330 F. Supp. 228, 229 (D. Colo. 1971). The brochure continued: "Our training
program is designed to make you thoroughly proficient regardless of the extent of your flight back-
ground. We are in the flying business and can give you all of the flying you need." Id. Unbe-
knownst to Spurlock, an internal memorandum adopted by the employer increased the requirements
to those set out above; subsequently United placed an advertisement that again raised the number of
flight hours, this time to 1000. Id Following his rejection, plaintiff amended his original application
to inform United that he had" 'increased my total flight time to five hundred hours, and earned my
multi-engine rating.'" Id. at 230.
147 475 F.2d at 218.
148 Id. It is interesting to note that although the courts found that the selection criteria were
uniformly applied, id. at 217, the evidence indicated at least two hires who did not meet these qualifi-
cations. See 330 F. Supp. at 231.
149 475 F.2d at 218.
150 330 F. Supp. at 235.
151 475 F.2d at 219 n.1.
152 Those trainees with 200 or less hours failed at a rate of 9%5, while those with 1500 hours or
more failed at a rate of only 2%. Yet the failure rate for persons with 201 to 500 hours went up to
14% (instead of down from 9%), and those with 501 to 1000 hours had nearly the same (8%) failure
rate as those with 200 hours or less. Id.
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necessity." 153
Spurlock thus treated success in the training program as synonymous
with competence on the job, and further characterized United's desire to
minimize training expenses as a business necessity.15 4 Both propositions
were substantial departures from the prevailing interpretation of
Griggs.' 55 Moreover, absent from both the trial and appellate court opin-
ions was the usual exploration of less discriminatory alternatives, such as
requiring fewer flight hours or years of college.' 56 In light of these
shortcomings, the Tenth Circuit attempted to limit its ruling.
When a job requires a small amount of skill and training and the
consequences of hiring an unqualified applicant are insignificant, the
courts should examine closely any pre-employment standard or crite-
ria which discriminates against minorities. In such a case, the em-
ployer should have a heavy burden to demonstrate to the court's
satisfaction that his employment criteria are job-related. On the other
hand, when the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the eco-
nomic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are
great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show
that his employment criteria are job-related.' 57
The court reasoned that because aircraft cost as much as twenty million
dollars and transport up to three hundred passengers, the public interest
in safety required the court to move with "great caution before requiring
an employer to lower his pre-employment standards for such a job."' 58
Significantly undermining the logic of Spurlock is the fact that the dis-
pute was over which licensed pilots would be accepted for the airliner
training program, not which trainees would ultimately be placed in the
cockpit of a United jetliner.' 59 While it is not open to debate that the
economic and human risks of placing an unqualified person in the latter
153 475 F.2d at 219 (footnote omitted). With regard to the college degree, the court continued:
United officials testified that the possession of a college degree indicated that the applicant
had the ability to understand and retain concepts and information given in the atmosphere
of a classroom or training program .... We think United met the burden of showing that its
requirement of a college degree was sufficiently job-related to make it a lawful pre-employ-
ment standard.
Id.
154 This equation of cost containment with business necessity may have been influenced by the
trial court's observation that "the air line industry has been in a slump." 330 F. Supp. at 230. This is
in stark contrast with the Fourth Circuit's rejection of United's "maximum return on training costs
investment" argument in support of an age BFOQin Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d
303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982).
155 See supra text accompanying notes 104-39.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 113-39.
157 Spurlock, 475 F.2d at 219 (citations omitted, emphasis added). The court cited to EEOC
Guidelines for its proposition that job relation should be measured on a sliding scale. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5(c)(2)(iii). See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 170. It has been observed
that the "Spurlock analysis could lead to the ironic situation that the higher the level of the job, the
less the burden on the employer to show that the qualifications are actually related to the ability to
perform that job." FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 47, at 57.
158 Spurlock, 475 F.2d at 219.
159 See MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION supra note 18, at 159-60. The district judge
seems to have confused these two, because in describing Spurlock's challenge to the entry require-
ments he wrote: "The logical next step would be to say that an applicant could not be failed in the
school anywhere along the way, but that he was entitled to complete the school no matter how
poorly he was doing." Spurlock, 330 F. Supp. at 235.
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position are staggering, the consequences of doing so with regard to the
training program seem simply to be the loss of investment in the unsuc-
cessful trainee. 160 A ruling in Spurlock's favor would have increased ac-
cess to the jetliner training program by modifying some of the
prerequisites; it would not have brought unqualified persons behind the
controls of a 747.
Containing training costs, rather than protecting public safety, was
therefore the real thrust of the airline's successful defense. Given that
United was far from a "Mom & Pop" business, 1 1 and that the pre-em-
ployment qualifications resulted in a nearly total exclusion of minorities
from United's thousands of pilot positions, the result reached in Spurlock
is hard to harmonize with Griggs and its progeny.
The "economic and human risks" gloss on the job relation/business
necessity defense has been widely adopted by the courts. 162 It has also
been invoked successfully by employers seeking to avoid the expense of
making individual rather than group selections. Furnco Construction Corp.
v. Waters ' 63 and New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer 14 are two cases
160 If United's training regimen had any validity whatsoever, it would certainly weed out those
persons who could not demonstrate the ability to safely pilot a modem airliner.
161 It would be a different business necessity case if, for example, the employer could not afford
to run any training program at all, but instead had to hire persons already experienced airline pilots.
United ran a program which it represented was "designed to make [trainees] thoroughly proficient
regardless... of your flight background," 330 F. Supp. at 229, and was merely seeking to avoid the
cost of training persons with a lower statistical probability of graduating.
162 See Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1972
(1986), and citations therein. In Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir.
1981), for example, a female applicant sought a position as yard employee with a company engaged
in transporting new automobiles by tractor-trailer. She was rejected because of the pre-employment
requirement for two years truck driving experience. While the court found that the requirement had
a demonstrable disparate impact and would exclude virtually all females, it concluded that the em-
ployer had met its burden ofjustification.
The important public interest in safety on the roads and highways is sufficiently
weighty to convince us that Complete Auto's experience requirement for yard employees is
manifestly related to the safe and efficient operation of its business of transporting
automobiles over the public highways.
645 F.2d at 1263 (citations omitted).
As suggested in the dissent, however, the exclusionary effect could have been avoided by the
expenditure of modest sums on a training program. 645 F.2d at 1268 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge
Keith noted that Complete Auto's yard employees rarely, if ever, drove trucks and employees hired
without the prior experience could be adequately prepared for the job of yard employee by undergo-
ing a minimal amount of on the job training. Id. at 1268.
See also Rice v. City of St. Louis, 464 F. Supp. 138, 142-43 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (requirement of
college degree for public health program representative upheld), aff'd, 607 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1979).
At least one court has limited the Spurlock doctrine to human, and not merely economic, risks. See
Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1977) where the court refused
to extend the Spurlock analysis to qualifications for a securities salesperson, a job which did not
involve public safety. The court stated:
[Defendant] asserts that, on the basis of business necessity, it decided not to invest in the
training of Kinsey, who lacked sales experience and sales motivation. Appellee relies on
Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc .....
We cannot earnestly compare the training program of a securities sales representative
with that of a flight officer who ultimately is responsible for the safety of passengers as well
as costly aircraft. In the latter, public interest is paramount and justifies high employment
standards. The cost of [defendant's] ... training program is not the economic risk that was
the concern of the court in Spurlock .... Mhe investment cost in training its salesmen
cannot sufficiently justify [defendant's] application of criteria which operates to freeze the
status quo of an historical preference for whites in the profession.
163 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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on point. Furnco was a Title VII action challenging the company's prac-
tice of limiting those eligible for positions as bricklayers to individuals
whose past work in that field was personally known to thejob superinten-
dent. The company was in the business of relining blast furnaces in steel
mills. Plaintiffs, black men who were experienced bricklayers, had unsuc-
cessfully sought employment at one of Furnco's jobsites. Although they
were fully qualified,16 5 their applications were rejected because their
names did not appear on the superintendent's list.166 Plaintiffs mounted
a challenge under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theo-
ries. Though the Court entertained only the disparate treatment
claim, 167 its opinion by Justice Rehnquist relied upon the concept of
business necessity:
The District court elaborated at some length as to the "critical"
necessity of insuring that only experienced and highly qualified
firebricklayers were employed. Improper or untimely work would re-
sult in substantial losses both to Interlake [the company for whom
Furnco was performing the work], which was forced to shut down its
furnace and lay off employees during the relining job, and to Furnco,
which was paid for this work at a fixed price and for a fixed time pe-
riod. In addition, not only might shoddy work slow this work process
down, but it also might necessitate costly future maintenance work
with its attendant loss of production and employee layoffs; diminish
Furnco's reputation and ability to secure similar work in the future;
and perhaps even create safety hazards, leading to explosions and the
like. These considerations justified Furnco's refusal to engage in on-
the-job training or to hire at the gate, a hiring process which would not
provide an adequate method of matching qualifications to job require-
ments and assuring that the applicants are sufficiently skilled and
capable. 168
The economic and human risks recited here would arise only if
Furnco were compelled to hire unqualified persons. But the analysis was
applied to a practice in which qualified bricklayers were rejected because
they were not part of the superintendent's network. Moreover, although
164 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
165 438 U.S. at 570.
166 The Court of Appeals concluded that the list consisted solely of white persons. 551 F.2d 1085
(7th Cir. 1977). Because of past charges of discrimination, however, the company had apparently
required its superintendent to supplement his list with names of some black bricklayers; this self-
imposed affirmative action plan resulted in a favorable bottom line for overall hiring. 438 U.S. at
571-72. Subsequent to its decision in Furnco, the Court has ruled that such a bottom line does not
insulate an otherwise discriminatory practice from a Griggs challenge. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982).
167 The court held for the first time that disparate impact theory was not applicable where the
"case did not involve employment tests . . . or particularized requirements such as the height and
weight specifications .... " 438 U.S. at 575 n.7 (citations omitted). This limitation of Griggs to
objective selection devices was criticized by the dissent, which would have directed the lower court to
explore the disparate impact challenge and, if a prima facie case were established, determine
whether the practice was "justified by business necessity." Id. at 583-84 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
168 438 U.S. at 570-71. Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which
the Court held applicable in Furnco, the employer's burden was to demonstrate that "the importance
of selecting people whose capability had been demonstrated to defendant's brick superintendent is a




the existence of less discriminatory alternatives would normally defeat a
claim of business necessity, such alternative selection devices were ig-
nored by the Court.' 69 Observing that "[c]ourts are generally less com-
petent than employers to restructure business practices,"' 70 the Court
permitted Furnco to continue its inexpensive selection procedures at the
price of work opportunities for qualified minority persons.
Beazer 171 was a class action challenge to the New York City Transit
Authority's (TA) rule against employing persons who use methadone, a
drug widely utilized as part of a transitional cure for heroin addiction.
The named plaintiffs were former employees and applicants who were
dismissed or refused employment because of their methodone use. They
claimed that the automatic exclusion from all positions 172 of persons suc-
cessfully undergoing methadone treatment violated the Griggs principle
because it operated disproportionately against minorities and could not
be justified on job relation/business necessity grounds. 173
The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. It found that blacks and
Hispanics suffered three times as much from the enforcement of the chal-
lenged rule, 74 that a substantial number of methadone users were just as
employable as other members of the general population, and that rou-
tine screening procedures augmented by information from the metha-
done programs would enable TA to identify the unqualified users on an
individual basis.' 75 Thus a blanket exclusion could not be justified, and
individual consideration of applicants would have to be undertaken. The
district court's injunction, however, permitted the TA to continue to ex-
clude methadone users from safety sensitive positions.
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the TA's exclusionary
169 The Court of Appeals had devised "a reasonable middle ground between immediate hiring
decisions on the spot and seeking out employees from among those known to the superintendent."
551 F.2d, at 1088. "A written application could be taken, with inquiry as to qualifications and expe-
rience. The applicant's claims could be checked and evaluated, and compared with the qualifications
and experience of those on the list." Id. at 1088-89.
170 438 U.S. at 578.
171 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 568
(1979).
172 Under this rule,
if it is revealed that a current employee of the TA is a user of methadone, he will be dis-
charged, or if an applicant for employment is a user of methadone, he will not be employed.
This policy applies to all positions in the TA regardless of whether they are operating or
nonoperating positions. Moreover, the policy operates as an absolute exclusion-no con-
sideration being given to individual factors such as recent employment history, successful
adherence to a methadone program, or evidence of freedom from heroin use.
399 F. Supp. at 1036. The TA employed about 47,000 persons at the time, and hired about 3,000
annually. 440 U.S. at 571; 399 F. Supp. at 1053.
173 The Court emphasized that the plaintiffs "have never attempted to present a discriminatory
purpose case and would be hard pressed to do so in the face of the District Court's explicit finding
that no animus motivated TA in establishing its policy .... 440 U.S. at 583-84 n.24 (citation
omitted, emphasis in original). Justice White disagreed with this assessment, suggesting there was
evidence of discriminatory purpose against the addict population, "composed largely of racial mi-
norities .... Id. at 609 n.15 (White, J., dissenting).
174 The District Court had found disparate impact in two statistics: of the TA employees who
were referred to the company doctor for suspected drug use, 81% were black or Hispanic; and
approximately 65% of all persons on methadone maintenance in New York City were black or His-
panic. 440 U.S. at 579. There were approximately 40,000 persons in New York City on methadone
maintenance at the time. 399 F. Supp. at 1037.
175 440 U.S. at 577.
19871
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
practice. The majority concluded that even if plaintiffs' "weak" statistical
showing established a prima facie case of discrimination, it was rebutted
by TA's demonstration that its narcotics rule is job related. 176
TA's legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency require
the exclusion of all users of illegal narcotics, barbituates, and amphet-
amines, and of a majority of all methadone users .... [T]hose goals
require the exclusion of all methadone users from the 25% of its posi-
tions that are "safety sensitive" . . . . [T]hose goals are significantly
served by-even if they do not require-TA's rule as it applies to all
methadone users including those who are seeking employment in non-
safety-sensitive positions.' 77
Writing for the dissenters, Justice White responded:
Petitioners had the burden of showing job relatedness. They did
not show that the rule results in a higher quality labor force, that such
a labor force is necessary, or that the cost of making individual deci-
sions about those on methadone was prohibitive. Indeed ... petition-
ers have not come close to showing that the present rule is
"demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance." No one
could reasonably argue that petitioners have made the kind of showing
demanded by Griggs or Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody. By petitioner's
own stipulation, this employment barrier was adopted "without mean-
ingful study of [its] relationship to job-performance ability." As we
stated in Washington v. Davis, Title VII "involves a more probing judi-
cial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of
administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitu-
tion . . . ." Therefore, unlike the majority, I think it insufficient that
the rule as a whole has some relationship to employment so long as a
readily identifiable and severable part of it does not. 178
As in Spurlock and Furnco, cost concerns permeate the Court's discus-
sion ofjob relation/business necessity. Although the majority conceded
that TA's rule was "broader than necessary,"' 79 it observed that any al-
ternative to the rule of total exclusion "is likely to be less precise-and
will assuredly be more costly.' 80 Individual screening would require
adoption of procedures for gathering information about applicants and
monitoring methadone users after they are hired.' 8 ' The Court empha-
sized that the respondents had failed to prove that unqualified metha-
done users "could be excluded as cheaply and effectively in the absence
of the rule."'18 2
As in Spurlock and Furnco, the cost dimension was couched in public
176 Id. at 587. The Court seemed to be suggesting that the weaker the prima facie case, the easier
it will be for the employer to show job relation/business necessity. See Note, Title VII: Discriminatoiy
Results and The Scope of Business Necessity, 35 LA. L. REv. 146, 154-56 (1974).
177 440 U.S. at 587 n.31 (citations omitted).
178 Id. at 602 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
179 Id. at 592.
180 Id. at 590.
181 Id. The district court had devised such procedures, primarily involving reference checks from
the methadone clinics.
182 Id. at n.33. The dissenters relied on the finding of the district court that "the bad risks could
be culled from this group [those who successfully participated in the maintenance program for one
year] through the normal processing of employment applications" and "without additional effort."
Id. at 608. See also 440 U.S. at 604.
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safety terms.' 8 3 But again the Court's approach misconstrues the ques-
tion in dispute-the Beazer plaintiffs did not contend that Title VII re-
quired the TA to risk disastrous consequences by employing drug
impaired persons as subway drivers. Rather, consistent with established
doctrine, they argued the Act required the TA to incur the additional
expenses involved in individualized screening instead of excluding per-
sons on the basis of a group characteristic. The Supreme Court decision
subordinates equal opportunity to the employer's bottom line. Alloca-
tion of costs, not business necessity or public safety, is what the Beazer
case was all about.
It has been observed that "the trend in the Court is to diminish the
level of the employer's burden of proving business necessity and to un-
dercut the vigorous enforcement of Title VII.' 8 4 A major thread in this
trend is the acceptance of cost avoidance as legal justification for prac-
tices which produce discriminatory effect. Had the BFOQ model been
applied in Furnco, Beazer, and Spurlock, those employers would have been
required to restructure their methods of selection to avoid the discrimi-
natory consequences of group screening.
The public safety rationale has also been employed to permit selec-
tion on the basis of gender. In Wright v. Olin Corp. 185 it was held that "an
employer may, as a matter of business necessity, impose otherwise im-
permissible restrictions on employment opportunity that are reasonably
required to protect the health of unborn children of women workers
against hazards of the workplace."' 1 6 Olin had adopted a "female em-
ployment and fetal vulnerability" program, an increasingly common risk-
oriented screening practice. 87 The program identified jobs requiring
contact with chemicals known or suspected to be harmful to fetuses or
female reproductive systems, and excluded women from such jobs. A
challenge was brought under Title VII.
The Fourth Circuit explicitly recognized that the BFOQ defense ap-
183 "For example, some 12,300 are subway motormen, towermen, conductors, or bus operators.
The District Court found that these jobs are attended by unusual hazards and must be performed by
'persons of maximum alertness and competence.'" 440 U.S. at 571. After recognizing the safety
concerns, the district court concluded: "[I]n my view the blanket exclusionary policy against persons on
methadone maintenance is not rationally related to the safety needs, or any other needs, of the TA. " 399 F. Supp.
at 1036 (emphasis added).
It is interesting to contrast the judicial response to the public safety/cost defense in a disparate
treatment context. In Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 727 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1984)
the court found that Kaiser failed to promote the plaintiff because of its "not necessarily misplaced
fear that Parson's promotion would trigger a violent and prolonged (and, thus, expensive) reaction
on the part of certain white, racially-motivated employees." Id. at 477. The court, citing Manhart,
held this was not a valid defense. Id. at 478.
184 See Note, supra note 9, at 404. The writer also discerns a trend "to reincorporate intent as an
element of the analysis." Id. at 410, 416-19.
185 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
186 Id. at 1189-90.
187 See 697 F.2d at 1187 n.24. For a general discussion of risk-oriented as compared with per-
formance oriented screening, see Buss, Getting Beyond Discrimination: A Regulatory Solution to the Problem
of Fetal Hazards in the Workplace, 95 YALE LJ. 577 (1986); Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work
Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66
IOWA L. REv. 63 (1980); Howard, supra note 19; McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 24.
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plied in such cases but found it too narrow to justify Olin's program.1 8 8
Instead the court chose to apply the "wider business necessity de-
fense." 18 9 In the court's view, the protection of workers' unborn chil-
dren can properly be considered business necessity if the employer can
prove "that significant risks of harm to the unborn children of women
workers from their exposure during pregnancy to toxic hazards in the
workplace make necessary, for the safety of the unborn children, that fer-
tile women workers, though not men workers, be appropriately restricted
from exposure to those hazards and that its program of restriction is ef-
fective for the purpose." 190 Such a showing could be rebutted by proof
that there are alternatives which are acceptable "in terms of their effec-
tiveness and their economic and technological feasibility," and would pro-
tect against fetal harm with less discrimination against females. 191
Although the court's stated focus was on the safety of the unborn
and it disavowed any concern for the potential tort liability that Olin
might incur as a result of its operations, 192 the question of cost allocation
lies at the core of cases like Wright. In adopting its fetal vulnerability
program, the company had rejected the alternatives of substituting non-
toxic materials in its plants, improving ventilation, or providing workers
with protective equipment because such alternatives were not "feasi-
ble."' 193 The Wright decision permits employers to maintain male only
workplaces even if the technology exists to make them safe for all work-
ers, because it defines infeasibility in cost as well as technological terms.
The employer need only demonstrate that the required reduction in
hazards would be economically infeasible. This "allows employers to
hide profit maximizing efficiency concerns behind contrived solicitude
for the well-being of others."1 94 Given the enormous number of females
who would be excluded under such programs, the weighing of cost con-
cerns in Wright contrasts sharply with the refusal of courts to do so in
188 697 F.2d at 1185-86 n.2 1. It certainly could not be shown that all or substantially all females
were unable to perform the tasks involved.
189 Id
190 Id. at 1190.
191 Id. at 1191 n.29 (emphasis added).
192 The court agreed with the plaintiffs that "the mere purpose to avoid liability and consequent
economic loss may not suffice, standing alone, to establish a business necessity defense." Id. at 1190
n.26. See also Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984) (potential
litigation costs in a lawsuit seeking recovery for fetal injury from exposure to radiation cannot form
the basis for the business necessity because that would "shift the focus of the business necessity
defense from a concern for the safety of Hospital patients to a focus of concern for Hospital fi-
nances." Id.).
193 697 F.2d at 1182.
194 See McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 24, at 1049. Writing before the decisional law in this
area developed, one commentator observed:
[E]mployers could not exclude members of the susceptible sex without first attempting to
eliminate or minimize the harmful effects .... By excluding all members of the susceptible
sex rather than alleviating the health problem, an employer avoids the responsibility for
maintaining a safe work environment. An employer cannot plead that the cost of eliminat-
ing the problem justifies a BFOQ because, as the EEOC has recognized, 'remedying ine-
quality normally costs money.' When the elimination of health hazards is technically
infeasible, a member of the susceptible sex should have the right to decide whether to work
in the dangerous job or industry.
Sirota, supra note 48, at 1059 (citations omitted). See also Howard, supra note 19, at 826-27.
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traditional BFOQcases. It also contrasts with the objective test cases like
Albermarle where the cost of validation is substantial. 19 5 On remand,
Olin's exclusionary program was upheld. The district court concluded
that all acceptable alternatives such as the use of respirators, better venti-
lation and the substitution of dangerous chemicals had been exhausted
or were not "feasible," and that the exclusionary practices were neces-
sary to protect the unborn.' 96
c. The Expansion of the Cost Defense-Fringe Benefits and Pay Equity
While the cost defense has often appeared in the context of cases
challenging selection criteria for positions affecting public safety, deci-
sional law documents its emergence into areas where only economic, not
human, risks are at stake.
Like Manhart and its progeny, Wambheim v. J. C. Penny Co. ,197 involved
a Title VII challenge to the employer's fringe benefit scheme, here its
medical plan. J.C. Penney adopted a head of household rule that limited
coverage of spouses to situations where the employee earned more than
half of the couple's total income.'98 As a result of this facially neutral
practice, only thirty-seven percent of married female employees received
dependent coverage, compared with ninety-five percent of the males. 199
Applying classic Griggs analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that a prima facie
case of disparate impact was established. The court, however, went on to
conclude thatJ.C. Penney had demonstrated business necessity by show-
ing the practice was keeping "the cost of the plan to its employees as low
as possible, so that the needy can afford coverage." 200 While admitting
that "[c]ost undoubtedly was a factor considered in the process," 20 1 the
court nevertheless rejected plaintiffs' assertion that this was an impermis-
195 See supra text accompanying notes 113-16. As one commentary has put it,
[t]he standard of review for risk-oriented screens that test for risk to the public is usually
quite lax, in stark contrast to the stringent validation requirements that the courts impose
upon performance-oriented employment screens. The courts often require employers to
spend vast sums to validate written performance examinations, but they willingly uphold
risk-oriented screens on the most farfetched allegations of threats to public safety.
McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 24, at 1038.
196 585 F. Supp. 1447, vacated on other grounds, 767 F.2d 915 (1984). The acceptability of less
discriminatory alternatives raises a question similar to the question presented by the undue hardship
cases. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text. In Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994 (5th
Cir. 1984), for example, the plaintiffs argued that Delta could have transferred rather than laid off
pregnant flight attendants. The Fifth Circuit held this did not constitute a "less discriminatory alter-
native": "thejob of flight attendant is manifestly distinct from any ground position; the training and
skills required are generally unrelated. Consequently it cannot be said that permitting such transfers
entailed no burden for the employer and was administratively a natural alternative to placing pregnant
flight attendants on maternity leave." 730 F.2d at 1001-02 (emphasis added). Compare Zuniga. v.
Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) and Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d
1543 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (discharge ofpregnant x-ray technicians unlawful where alternatives to protect
fetus were available).
197 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). See supra text accompanying
notes 35-47.
198 Prior to its adoption, only male employees were eligible for coverage for their spouses. 705
F.2d at 1493.
199 705 F.2d at 1493-94. The court found that 12.5%o of the married female employees qualified
as heads of households, compared to nearly 90%6 of the married males. Id.
200 705 F.2d at 1495.
201 Id.
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sible defense under Manhart. That case was not controlling, the court
held, because the challenged fringe benefit rule was neutral, and not in-
tended to promote discrimination between the sexes. 202 No explanation
was provided for basing the propriety of cost justification on the element
of intent, when the undeniable effect of Penney's policy was nearly as
exclusionary as its previous overt policy of excluding all female employ-
ees from dependent coverage. 20 3
The notion that avoidance of the costs of compliance can constitute
a justification for practices with discriminatory effect has expanded into
the realm of pay equity. Plaintiffs in comparable worth litigation have
invoked the Griggs principle to challenge disparate wage structures,20 4
contending that the practice of setting wages by reference to the existing
labor market perpetuates the bias therein against female workers. 205
Such a showing would seem to require the employer to demonstrate that
the wage setting practice is somehow job related or dictated by business
necessity. The courts that have dealt with these cases have, however,
permitted employers to raise what amounts to a cost defense.
In Christensen v. State of Iowa,206 for example, a class of female em-
ployees at the state university brought a Title VII action challenging the
University's practice of paying less for clerical work than it did for main-
202 Id.
203 By permitting cost cutting through the limitation of health coverage, Wambheim reaches a con-
trary result than that reached in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669
(1983). In that case, the Court struck down under Title VII a health benefit plan that covered all
medical conditions for spouses of female employees, but provided only limited pregnancy coverage
for spouses of male employees. The plan was held unlawful because it afforded less protection to
married male employees than married female employees. 462 U.S. at 676. The Court explained that
"if a private employer were to provide complete health insurance coverage for the dependents of its
female employees, and no coverage at all for the dependents of its male employees, it would violate
Title VII." Id. at 682. The additional cost of providing equal coverage was explicitly rejected as
justification for refusing to do so. Id. at 685 n.26. Yet Wambheim accepts the very same cost justifica-
tion on the ground that Penneys' practice discriminated indirectly, rather than directly.
204 Title VII includes a prohibition against discrimination "with respect to ... compensation."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
205 See generally B. ScHLi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 478. The Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the viability of comparable worth theory, but in County of Washington v. Gun-
ther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) it held that Title VII wage disparity claims are not restricted (as are claims
under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)) to jobs involving equal work. The Bennett Amend-
ment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) was held to incorporate into Title VII only the affirmative defenses of
the Equal Pay Act. Gunther involved a claim that the employer intentionally set wages for female jobs
below what it knew through its own survey they were actually worth. The Court's decision left open
the question of "the nature or contours of the 'comparable worth' lawsuit." B. Schlei & P. Gross-
man, supra note 48, at 474. For discussion of the application of impact theory, see generally Brown,
Equal Pay for Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis of the Rhetoric, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127
(1986); Loudon, Applying Disparate Impact to Title VII Comparable Worth Claims: An Incomparable Task, 61
IND. L. REV. 165 (1986); Note, Comparable Worth, Disparate Impact, and the Market Rate Salary Problem: A
Legal Analysis and Statistical Application, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 730 (1983); Note, Sex-based Wage Discrimina-
tion Under Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083 (1982); Note, The Exception Swallows
the Rule: Market Conditions as a "Factor Other Than Sex" in Title VII Disparate Impact Litigation, 86 W. VA.
L. REV. 165 (1983).
For a general discussion of wage rates and their relationship to gender segregation of the labor
market see Blumrosen, supra note 24; Note, Use of the Market Wage Rate in Employment Discrimination
Suits: Equal Work as the Key to Application, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513 (1986); See also Hoyman &
Stallworth, Suit Filing By Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 69-70 (1986);
Note, supra note 205, 86 W. VA. L. REV. at 165-68 and citations therein, describing the wage gap
between men and women.
206 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
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tenance work of comparable value to the employer.20 7 Prior to 1974, the
University set wage scales for its nonprofessional positions by reference
to the local labor market. Since this labor market was segregated by sex,
the court concluded that "UNI's pay system perpetuated the traditional
disparity between the wages paid to women and those paid to men."208
In an effort to remove these inequities, the University adopted the Hayes
System "under which compensation was to be based on an objective eval-
uation of each job's relative worth to the employer regardless of the mar-
ket price."' 20 9 Each position was evaluated according to thirty-eight
factors and assigned a value.
In implementing the new pay scheme, however, the University ulti-
mately disregarded the job value ratings produced by the objective sys-
tem. Instead, it modified the system by providing for an advanced step in
starting pay for many of the physical plant employees, but not for begin-
ning clerical employees, because the local job market paid higher wages
for physical plant jobs than the beginning pay under the system. "As a
result, some physical plant employees, mostly male, continued to be paid
more than clerical employees, all female, despite equivalent seniority and
labor grade." 210
Premising their challenge on Griggs, plaintiffs attacked the em-
ployer's practice of setting wages in reliance on the labor market, which
given the Hayes study had a demonstrable disparate impact on the sala-
ries of female employees. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
dismissal, stating:
[Plaintiffs'] theory ignores economic realities. The value of the
job to the employer represents but one factor affecting wages. Other
factors may include the supply of workers willing to do the job and the
ability of the workers to band together to bargain collectively for
higher wages. We find nothing in the text and history of Title VII
suggesting that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of supply and
demand or other economic principles that determine wage rates for
various kinds of work. We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an
employer to ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely dif-
ferent work classifications. 2 11
The acceptance of a Title VII market rate defense in Christensen and
elsewhere 21 2 is particularly troublesome in light of the explicit rejection




211 Id. at 356 (footnote omitted). One writer has read the implicit holding of Christensen to re-
quire the employer invoking the market rate defense to "demonstrate, by a preponderence of the
evidence, a shortage of qualified workers or an actual difficulty in recruiting workers for certain
jobs;" then Tide VII would permit "the pay differential necessary to attract, retain, and motivate
competent employees" as a form of business necessity. See Loudon, supra note 205, at 183. There
was, however, no such showing made by the University or relied upon by the court in that case.
212 See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986) (practice of paying market
wage rate not actionable under Title VII despite employer's knowledge that its wage structure disad-
vantages women and ability to alter wage structure in favor of comparable worth); American Fed.
State, County and Municipal Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) ("the decision
to base compensation on the competitive market, rather than on a theory of comparable worth" is
too complex to be analyzed under Griggs theory. 770 F.2d at 1406); Spaulding v. University of Wash-
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of this same defense in Equal Pay Act litigation. As the Christensen court
recognized, 213 the market rate justification is not available to an em-
ployer who pays women lower wages than men for equal work.214 The
Equal Pay Act as interpreted by the courts does indeed abrogate the laws
of supply and demand. It operates in the same way that minimum wage
legislation compels employers to pay more for certain positions than they
would have to on the open market.21 5 Yet the Title VII cases have per-
mitted employers to exploit gender segregation in the labor market by
paying females less than the employer's own assessment of their worth,
and then to defend this practice on cost containment grounds. 216
The success of the market rate defense should be viewed in the con-
text of the more general development of cost defense in impact litiga-
tion. Again we observe the phenomenon of judicial rejection of cost
containment as ajustification for discrimination which is overt and direct
(unequal pay for equal work) contrasted with the acceptance of suchjus-
ington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Lemons v. City and County of
Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Briggs v. City of Madison,
536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982). One treatise even concludes that "the Supreme Court in Gun-
ther gave [the market rate defense] tacit approval." See B. SCHLmi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at
479. At least one court has questioned the validity of the market rate defense under Title VII. See
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982) (permitted employer to use prior
salary as the basis for a new employee's salary only if the employer had an acceptable business
reason for doing so. "Not every reason making economic sense is acceptable." Id.). See also Norris
v. Arizona Governing Comm., 671 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) ("Title
VII has never been construed to allow an employer to maintain a discriminatory practice merely
because it reflects the market place ... .
213 563 F.2d at 356 n.7.
214 See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). In Corning the Court determined
that higher wages were paid to night inspectors (all of whom were male) because of the need to
recruit men to perform what was regarded as women's work and "simply because men would not
work at the low rates paid women inspectors." The wage differential thus "reflected ajob market in
which Coming could pay women less than men for the same work." The Court nevertheless con-
cluded that while the company's taking advantage of such a situation may be understandable as a
matter of economics, its differential "became illegal once Congress enacted into law the principle of
equal pay for equal work." 417 U.S. at 205. See also Brennan v. Victorial Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d
896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejected as justification for the wage differential that women were willing to
work for less than men); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970)
(rejected as justification for pay differential that orderlies could not be recruited in the existing labor
market unless they were paid more than nurses); Marshall v. Georgia Southwestern College, 489 F.
Supp. 1322, 1330 (M.D. Ga. 1980) (rejected the employer's market supply & demand justification for
the differential between female and male professors). Differences in productivity or profitability, on
the other hand, do constitute proper justification under the Equal Pay Act for a wage differential.
See, e.g., Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1973) (difference in profitability between the men's and women's departments was a factor other
than sex justifying a wage disparity); Futran v. Ring Radio Co., 501 F. Supp. 734, 739 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (talk show host's ability to generate revenues can constitute a "factor other than sex" to justify
a wage disparity).
215 It has been suggested that the Equal Pay Act was "designed to reform [a gender-based labor]
market to end the gender bias, just as the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standard Act
(of which the Equal Pay Act is a part) were designed to make jobs pay more than the market would
yield." MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 18, at 549.
216 The allowance of a market rate defense in Title VII litigation has been widely criticized in the
literature. See Brown, supra note 205, at 169; Note, supra note 205, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 753 ("An
employer's bare reliance on prevailing market wages to set salary rates should not qualify under any
definition of business necessity."); Note, supra note 205, 86 W. VA. L. REV. at 184 ("Given that both
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act serve the same fundamental purpose against discrimination based on
sex, it is difficult to appreciate the different analyses given the defense of market conditions
presented under the two Acts.").
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tification when the discrimination results from the operation of a "neu-
tral" rule (like market rate).
A major component of impact theory is the recognition that neutral
personnel practices can have an adverse impact on protected groups be-
cause of conditions outside the employer's control. In Griggs, therefore,
the condition of inferior educational opportunities for blacks in North
Carolina was the triggering mechanism for the disparate impact of Duke
Power's selection criteria. Despite the Company's lack of responsibility
for unequal education, it was adjudged in violation of Title VII and or-
dered to adapt its practices to the realities of societal inequities. Yet
cases adopting cost justification in pay equity litigation ignore this funda-
mental point. Thus in Briggs v. City of Madison,217 the district court ruled
in favor of the employer based on its market rate defense stating that
"[u]nder Title VII, an employer's liability extends only to its own acts of
discrimination. Nothing in the Act indicates that the employer's liability
extends to conditions of the marketplace which it did not create." 218
As a doctrinal matter, it is not readily apparent why Duke Power
Company must absorb the expense of restructuring its hiring practices in
order to avoid the disparate impact that results from unequal educational
opportunities, while that same employer need not absorb the increased
labor costs of restructuring its compensation or fringe benefit scheme so
as to avoid the disparate impact that results from a gender segregated
labor market.2 19 Perhaps the unspoken difference is one of magnitude-
the overall expense of undertaking comprehensive job evaluation studies
and equalizing 220 wage structures is potentially of an order much greater
than that involved in test validation. Whether enforcement of equal op-
portunity law should ever be suspended in the interest of cost savings,
regardless of the size of the cost, will be dealt with in the next section.
III. The Case Against the Cost Defense
While Griggs seemed to establish "that the national interest in elimi-
nating employment discrimination overrides the employer's interest in
administrative convenience and cost saving," 221 recent decisional law has
begun to tip the balance the other way. Restrictions originally placed on
employer justification for discriminatory practices-such as the require-
ments for an empirical showing ofjob relation and the absence of a less
217 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
218 Id. at 447.
219 As one Treatise has aptly noted, Christensen and Manhart
cannot be reconciled since Manhart gains implicit support from the disparate impact cases.
For example, in a testing case like Griggs, the employer, forced to forego the use of a test
because it is not job related, may have to spend more money selecting employeesthough
[sic] other techniques such as interviews, on-the-job trials or the creation of a new and valid
test. Another example would be the garnishment case where an employer, taking account
of the fact that minority group employees are more likely to have their wages garnished,,
abrogates a rule providing for discharge of garnished employees, thus undertaking the
costs of handling garnishments.
FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 47, at § 1.5, p.4 4 .
220 Under the Equal Pay Act, an employer is not permitted to equalize wages by lowering the
higher salaries; it must, instead, raise the lower ones. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
221 Note, supra note 205, 71 CALIF. L. REV. at 754.
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discriminatory alternative-have in many contexts given way to a busi-
ness necessity defense which in reality is based on cost avoidance. Signif-
icantly, in none of the decisions in which this has occurred has the
defense been premised on a showing that the cost of compliance would
be prohibitive, or would threaten the viability of the enterprise. The al-
lowance of such cost justification in fair employment law is ill-advised. If
Title VII is to operate effectively in the American workplace to extend
opportunities to groups traditionally excluded, justification for discrimi-
natory practices must be narrowly confined to situations where job per-
formance, productivity,222 or the very financial existence of the
enterprise is at stake. The dollar costs of compliance are properly placed
upon employers; minorities and women should not be required to suffer
loss of equal opportunity in the interest of budget cutting. The Supreme
Court recognized this when in Manhart it eschewed cost justification, and
the same concerns compel a similar repudiation in disparate impact as
well as disparate treatment cases.
The innovation of Griggs was based on the realization that employers
can do as much harm to minorities and women by unintentional acts as
they can by acts designed to discriminate. The Court, having observed
firsthand the tremendous difficulty plaintiffs have in proving discrimina-
tory intent, equated the two types of employer behavior for purposes of
Title VII enforcement. 223 Given the equation of purposeful discrimina-
tion and practices which are its functional equivalent, the affirmative de-
fenses in both types of lawsuits should be substantially similar.
The case against the cost defense emerges when we consider it
against the background of legislative goals underlying Title VII, the con-
gressional response to Griggs, and the widespread rejection of cost justifi-
cation in analogous contexts. It would be disingenuous to contend that
the Eighty-Eighth Congress actually anticipated the development of im-
pact doctrine and the business necessity component thereof when it en-
acted Title VII in 1964.224 What is clear is that Congress adopted as its
goal the elimination of employment discrimination, 225 and sought "to se-
222 As the Court observed in 1982, "Title VII guarantees ... individual[s] ... the opportunity to
compete equally with white workers on the basis ofjob-related criteria." Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 451 (1982).
223 See generally Brodin, supra note 16. As has been noted, "disparate impact doctrine furthers a
number of social purposes," including aiding in the elimination of covert intentional discrimination
for which proof of intent is lacking, alleviating the present harm due to past discrimination, facilitat-
ing the elimination of prejudice based on nonmerit grounds, and reducing inequities between
groups in the society. See, Note, Wage Discrimination, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083, 1089-90 (1982).
224 See Note, supra note 103, 84 YALE LJ. at 98 ("the business necessity doctrine thus adopted in
Griggs appears in neither the explicit language nor the legislative history of the 1964 Act."). Some
writers have found in the general legislative history support for a broad business necessity defense.
See Comment, supra note 103; Note, supra note 103, 84 YALE LJ. at 104 ("Congress evidenced a
substantial concern for preserving business efficiency and indicated that Title VII was not intended
to interfere with productivity."). Others read the same history to envision a narrow defense. See
Blumrosen, supra note 48, at 83 ("the precise issue, whether management prerogatives and business
convenience would be subordinated to the need to eliminate racial discrimination, was confronted
and rejected by both houses of Congress," citing the defeat of an amendment which would have
exonerated employers who believed in good faith that the discriminatory practice would be "more
beneficial to the normal operations of his particular business or to its good will.").
225 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963).
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cure to all persons of all races, color, religions, and nationalities the right
to share equally and fairly in the opportunities for employment through-
out the range of the national economy." 226 Congress thus spoke expan-
sively in prohibiting practices which "deprive or tend to deprive" anyone
of such opportunities. 227 When Congress did address the question of
business justification in 1964, it did so by creating a narrow BFOQ 228
And in 1972 Congress "recognized and endorsed the disparate impact
analysis employed by the Court in Griggs." 229 Under these circumstances
it is fair to conclude that Congress viewed the reasonable expenses nec-
essary to eliminate discrimination as a cost of doing business, and not a
justification for continuing such discrimination. 230
Not surprisingly, the question of cost justification has arisen in many
226 S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1964).
227 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982).
228 See supra notes 48-83 and accompanying text. In its decision in Wright, the Fourth Circuit
observed:
[The BFOQJ was obviously designed as a necessary, narrow exception to the otherwise flat
prohibition against the most obvious form of employment discrimination-an overt qualifi-
cation such as "males only." But nothing in the statutory exception itself or in Title VII in
general suggested that this defense defined the full reach of business justification defenses
under Title VII-whether to overt or other forms of discrimination-and the Griggs Court's
recognition of the obviously wider business necessity defense soon confirmed that this was
not the case.
697 F.2d at 1185 n.21. It is the position of this Article that the BFOQprovision does indeed set the
contours for all business justification under the Act.
229 Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8. When Congress adopted the 1972 Amendments to Title VII (see the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-17 (1982)) which expanded the enforcement powers of the EEOC,
it in effect ratified Griggs. See Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972-A
Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. LJ. 105 (1986), which concludes:
An examination of the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 reveals that the disparate impact theory of discrimination was ratified in the
1972 amendments.
Congress was aware of the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and realized its impor-
tance in eradicating discrimination. Although the Griggs doctrine was not debated nor ex-
pressly approved by the 1972 amendments, proponents of the bill embraced the doctrine
and used it to support their arguments in favor of various provisions of the bill. Congress
also insisted that federal employees be protected under Title VII and directed the Civil
Service Commission to comply with the requirements of Griggs. Thus, in the 1972 amend-
ments, Congress ratified Griggs and the disparate impact theory of discrimination.
Id. at 116. See also Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 945, 982
(1982) (taking the position that the 1972 Amendments constituted ratification of Griggs theory). The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed Griggs on several occasions. See Teal, 457 U.S. 440; County of Wash-
ington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981). For a recent scathing attack on impact theory which
concludes that Congress did not intend to prohibit disparate impact, see Gold, Griggs' Folly: An
Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. LJ. 429 (1985).
230 One writer has observed with reference to the comparable worth area:
Objections relating to the cost of remedying sex-based wage discrimination are often
misplaced. Title VII's primary objective is the achievement of equitable, not economically
efficient, employment practices. In enacting Title VII, Congress in no way authorized the
courts to balance the cost of eliminating wage discrimination against its benefits. Nothing
in the legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress placed a price tag on the cost of
correcting discrimination in employment .... Even if Title VII was concerned with eco-
nomic efficiency, it embodies an assumption that inequitable employment practices impair
the operation of the labor market, in that such practices are ultimately inefficient. A market
concerned with traits unrelated to job capacity (such as sex) is not performing at its fullest
capacity.
Note, supra note 205, 86 W. VA. L. REv. at 186 (footnote omitted).
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other contexts, and it is instructive to observe its treatment elsewhere.
As noted above,23 1 an employer's goal of minimizing its labor costs does
not constitute legal justification for paying females less than males for
equal work, or for paying wages below the statutory minimum. Cost
avoidance is also unacceptable as a defense to an action under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 23 2 It has been noted that
"[b]ecause some costs are directly associated with aging, such as in-
creased pension and benefit costs and higher wages paid to senior em-
ployees, the cost of retaining any individual employee usually increases
over time." 23 3 "Thus, particularly in reduction-in-force situations, the
employer's temptation is to effect maximum cost reductions by laying off
the older employees." 23 4 Similarly, if an employer is required (by collec-
tive bargaining agreement or otherwise) to pay new employees on a sal-
ary scale that increases with past experience, the incentive may be to hire
younger applicants. In short, "if employers are permitted to make em-
ployment decisions based on cost, systematic discrimination against the
aged could result." 23 5 In recognition of this, cost containment has not
generally been accepted as a "reasonable factor other than age" or
"good cause," the affirmative defenses under the ADEA. 23 6
Geller v. Markham 2 3 7 illustrates that the rejection of cost justification
231 See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
232 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
233 Note, The Cost Defense Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 1982 DuKE .J. 580, 581
(1982). See also Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, (E.D. Mich. 1976)
Cost differentials in employment have been denominated as the real rather than imagined
reasons for discrimination against the aged. Higher employment costs may result from in-
creased direct compensation or benefit programs, higher training costs, and higher costs
brought about by the diminished productivity of older persons resulting from reduced abil-
ity or physical disabilities.
Id. at 1317 (footnote omitted).
234 Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the ADEA: Variation on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REv.
621, 657 (1983).
235 Note, supra note 233, at 581.
236 See EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984) (rejected argument that forced
retirement can be justified on economic necessity grounds absent showing that the necessity for
drastic cost reductions is real and there is no less discriminatory alternative); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSS-
MAN, sypra note 48, at 506 and citations therein; Player, supra note 234, at 657 and citations therein;
Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE LJ.
565, 574-87 (1979). See also Department of Labor Interpretive Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h)
(1986):
A general assertion that the average cost of employing older workers as a group is higher
than the average cost of employing younger workers as a group will not be recognized as a
differentiation under the terms and provisions of the Act, unless one of the other statutory
exceptions applies. To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the pur-
pose of comparing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on the assumption that
the age factor alone may be used to justify a differentiation-an assumption plainly contrary
to the terms of the Act and the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based
would serve only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at which the Act is
directed.
The writers in the age area have distinguished between direct or absolute costs (such as salary
and fringe benefits) which they conclude are improper bases for decision making, and indirect costs
(such as lost productivity and increased absenteeism), which are proper bases. See B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 507; Note, supra note 233, at 582; Note, supra note 236, at 567. This
distinction is consistent with the proposition set forth in this Article that business necessity must be
based on productivity concerns, and not the expense of compliance.
237 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
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under the ADEA extends to impact cases as well as those of overt, direct
discrimination. Geller involved a claim that the defendant school board's
policy of giving hiring preference to teachers with less than five years
experience had a disproportionate impact on older applicants. On the
basis of plaintiff's statistical showing, the Second Circuit agreed and
found the policy discriminatory under the Griggs theory. The school
board asserted that the preference was nevertheless "supportable as a
necessary cost-cutting gesture in the face of tight budgetary con-
straints, '238 because of the higher salaries that had to be paid to exper-
ienced teachers. The court explicitly rejected this cost justification.239
Cost has been accepted by some courts as a "factor other than age"
when used in conjunction with an assessment of the individual em-
ployee's productivity on the job. Thus in Donnelly v. Exxon Research and
Engineering Co. 240 the employer had a policy of discharging persons who
were not producing at least seventy-five percent of the value of their
wages. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that this relative cost formula
would adversely affect older employees, whose salaries had risen against
falling productivity. In so ruling, the court emphasized the job perform-
ance component of Exxon's policy:
It would be unlawful . . .if an employer were to fire an older
worker doing satisfactory work who, because of his seniority, received
a certain salary because the employer wished to replace him with
someone else who would do no better work but who, as a younger man
with less seniority, would do the work for less. 24 1
The courts in the equal pay and age discrimination areas have ac-
knowledged that enforcement of the fair employment principle compels
prohibition of cost-cutting measures which adversely affect protected
238 Id. at 1034.
239 Id.
In dissenting from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with
"the rationale employed by the Court of Appeals in rejecting the Board's 'cost' justification for its
policy." 451 U.S. at 948. Asserting that the defendant was entitled to discriminate against exper-
ienced applicants because that was a factor other than age, he chastised the Second Circuit for
"tie[ing] the hands of local school boards in dealing with ever-increasing costs ...." Id.
For other cases rejecting a cost defense under the ADEA, see Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State
College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1978) (the employer's faculty reduction plan, which gave a
preference in retention to untenured members and thus had an adverse impact against older faculty,
could not be justified on cost savings grounds); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 316 (6th
Cir. 1975) (economically motivated reduction in force "would not dispose of the case if Laugesen's
age induced Anaconda to discharge him instead of someone else."); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear,
Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979)
("Where economic savings and expectations of longer future service are directly related to an em-
ployee's age, it is a violation of the ADEA to discharge the employee for those reasons."); Bishop v.
JeHeffAssocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 590 (D.D.C. 1974) (termination to avoid vesting of pension benefits
was because of age and thus in violation ofADEA); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, 14 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 737-39 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (consent judgment; employer may not maximize profits by
choosing the younger employees for trainee positions).
240 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417 (D.NJ. 1974), aff'd mem., 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975).
241 Id. at 421-22. See also Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1216 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(employer may only terminate on basis of cost if high cost is related to low performance); Note, supra
note 233, at 582, 598. But see Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1319 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (ADEA permits employer "to consider employment costs where such consideration is predi-
cated upon an individual as opposed to a general assessment that the older worker's cost of employ-
ment is greater than for other workers").
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groups and which are not performance based. Many an employer with an
eye on costs would be induced to employ a workforce of minimally com-
petent persons, selected by means of the most inexpensive procedures,
willing to accept the lowest wage, and requiring the least expenditures in
terms of fringe benefits and accommodations. 242 Antidiscrimination leg-
islation seeks the inclusion into that workforce of others who are able to
perform the work but may require more expensive selection devices in
order to be identified, or higher costs once on the job. Adoption of a
cost defense not based on productivity or performance (either actual or
predicted) will significantly restrict employment opportunities for those
intended as beneficiaries of such legislation. 243
The question of the propriety of imposing on business the costs of
complying with legislation deemed in the public interest is not, of course,
limited to fair employment law.244 In such areas as antitrust and labor
relations, cost avoidance or profit maximization generally do not suffice
to justify statutory violations. 245 Indeed even when the economic sur-
vival of the company is at stake, it has been held that violations of labor
relations legislation cannot be justified on the basis of the financial
exigencies. 246
To the extent that decisions such as Beazer and Spurlock represent an
242 An example of this phenomenon is the relocation of company facilities to geographical areas
with lower labor and operating costs. As has been noted,
[s]uch decisions may well cause a disparate impact on minorities because of broad residen-
tial segregation in our society. Thus, when an employer with an inner city plant with a work
force that reflects minority representation in the city decides to close that plant and move
the work to a plant in an area of low minority population, the impact on minority group
employment opportunities is clear.
FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATON, supra note 47, at § 1.5. Some have thus suggested
application of the Griggs principle to relocation cases. Id. (and citations therein). But see Image of
Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting an impact challenge to a
reduction in force by the Air Force because it was "based in economic necessity and sound business
sense"); Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 608 F. Supp. 1013 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (rejecting an
impact challenge to a plant relocation).
243 This writer thus rejects the approach proposed in Note, supra note 103, 84 YALE LJ. 98, in
which an employer would not be required to avoid disparate impact by substituting a less discrimina-
tory practice if the cost differential between the challenged practice and the alternative is "not insub-
stantial." Id. at 115. This proposal would perpetuate the solicitude towards profit maximization that
has undercut the effectiveness of the Griggs principle. See, e.g., Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770
F.2d 1421, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the cost savings of using one selection device over
a less discriminatory one is a legitimate basis for continuing use of the more discriminatory device).
244 In the public sector, of course, it has long been acknowledged that the cost of implementing
constitutional rights is not sufficient to override the provision of those rights. See, e.g., Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 n.29 (1972).
245 See Note, supra note 236, at 589-90 and citations therein (discussing the "failing company"
defense in antitrust litigation and analogous defenses in the labor field).
246 See NLRB v. Manley Truck Line, Inc., 779 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir. 1985). The N.L.R.B., having
found that the employer violated § 8(d) of the National Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
§ 141-187 (1982)) by unilaterally implementing a wage deferral program that modified an existing
collective bargaining agreement, refused to hold the action excused by the doctrine of compelling
economic necessity. The employer made a showing based on "a generally depressed national econ-
omy, an energy crisis," and its own particularly bleak financial picture. 779 F.2d at 1328. It asserted
that the wage deferral plan was a necessary means of cost reduction "to avoid bankruptcy, plant
closure, and the loss ofjobs." Id. at 1330. The Seventh Circuit held that the Board acted properly
in refusing to carve out an "economic necessity" exception. Compare NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 U.S. 513 (1984), holding that a debtor in possession may unilaterally modify a collective bar-
gaining agreement during bankrupcy proceedings without running afoul of § 8(d).
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implicit cost-benefit analysis, in which the court determines whether
elimination of the discriminatory practice is justified when viewed against
the costs of doing so, it is significant to note that such analysis has been
rejected in the analogous occupational safety area. In American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan 247 the cotton industry challenged
the standard set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) which limited the exposure of textile workers to cotton dust
which causes brown lung disease. OSHA estimated the total industry-
wide cost of compliance at $656.5 million. The manufacturers' trade
group argued that the Occupational Safety and Health Act,2 48 which was
designed "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions, ' 249 required OSHA to
demonstrate that the reduction in risk of harm to workers was justified in
light of the costs of attaining that reduction. OSHA countered that the
statutory language mandating the standard "which most adequately as-
sures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health" 250 required
the adoption of the most stringent standard, bounded only by technolog-
ical and economic feasibility. A cost-benefit approach, the government
argued, would amount to "placing a [dollar] value on human life and
freedom from suffering. '"251
Ruling in favor of the government's interpretation, the Court held
that Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and ben-
efits, by placing the benefit of worker health above all other considera-
tions. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the
Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress
would be inconsistent with the command set forth in the Act. Thus feasi-
bility analysis rather than cost-benefit analysis is required by the
statute.252
"Feasible" was defined for the purposes of OSHA as "capable of
being done." 253 It is limited in an economic sense only in the situation
where achieving the workplace safety standard would threaten the eco-
nomic viability of the industry.2 54 Congress used the term "feasible" be-
247 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
248 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
249 Id. § 651(b).
250 Id. § 655(b)(5).
251 452 U.S. at 507 n.26.
252 Id. at 509 (citations omitted). The Court noted that "[w]hen Congress has intended that an
agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the fact of the statute."
Id at 510.
For a discussion of other public health statutes which have been interpreted to be "cost-oblivi-
ous," see Schwartz, supra note 15, at 294-95. Compare Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985), holding that Congress intended in its Clean Water Act to
grant the Environmental Protection Agency authority to issue variances to plants not economically
capable of meeting pollution standards.
253 American Textile Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 508.
254 Id. at 522. As Judge McGowan put it in an earlier decision, "Congress does not appear to
have intended to protect employees by putting their employers out of business," and thus a standard
"that is prohibitively expensive is not 'feasible.'" Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499
F.2d 467, 477-78 (1973). Yet he added that "[s]tandards may be economically feasible even though,
from the standpoint of employers, they are financially burdensome and affect profit margins ad-
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cause it was "concerned that the Act might be thought to require
achievement of absolute safety, an impossible standard, and therefore in-
sisted that health and safety goals be capable of economic and technolog-
ical accomplishment." 25 5 Congress, however, "was fully aware that the
Act would impose real and substantial costs of compliance on the indus-
try, and believed that such costs were part of the cost of doing
business." 256
This feasibility approach closely resembles the one adopted in the
BFOQ and early business necessity case law. 257 The employer is re-
quired to discontinue practices that discriminate (directly or indirectly)
unless it can be demonstrated that the practice is essential to the exist-
ence of the business and there is no feasible alternative. Manhart
notwithstanding, the past decade has seen a judicial drift towards a very
different approach in which cost containment and cost-benefit analysis
play a significant role. Given the implications of this development for the
enforcement of the fair employment principle, and the absence of a clear
indication from Congress that cost avoidance can excuse noncompliance
with Title VII, this development must be viewed with great concern.
Moreover, the Title VII enforcement mechanism is not structured to
facilitate a sophisticated, ad hoc cost-benefit approach. While Congress
has delegated to an administrative agency, OSHA, broad authority to set
and enforce standards of workplace safety, 258 the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission is designed merely to investigate Title VII com-
plaints and seek conciliation of those found justified. It has the power to
issue administrative interpretations of Title VII but it lacks rule-making
authority.259 It is in the federal district courts that Title VII standards
are developed and enforcement is accomplished; such courts seem ill-
equipped to engage in the kind of intensive financial fact inquiry re-
quired by the cost-benefit calculus. 260
Professor Tribe has recently complained that in the constitutional
law area, the Supreme Court is "coming increasingly to resemble a judi-
cial Office of Management and Budget, straining constitutional discourse
versely." 499 F.2d at 478. See also Howard, supra note 19, at 847 (asserting that while it is unreason-
able to require employers in the interest of worker safety to incur prohibitive costs that would lead to
bankruptcy, substantial costs short of that are appropriate). It has been similarly noted in the fair
employment context that "costliness does become significant in extreme circumstances. A remedy
should not be imposed which threatens a business with extinction." Note, Developments in the Law--
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1150
(1971).
255 452 U.S. at 514.
256 Id.
257 See supra notes 48-83 & 104-39 and accompanying text.
258 See Schwartz, supra note 15 at 295-96.
259 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982). See generally Pierce, The Regulation of Genetic
Testing in the Workplace-A Legislative Proposal, 46 OHIo ST. LJ. 771, 830 (1985).
260 For a pessimistic view of courts' "ability to evolve workable concepts to direct the economic
forces" involved in the areas of labor, unfair competition and monopoly, see LANDIS, THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESS 33-34 (1938). See also Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV.
614, 619 (1927) (observing that there are certain "fields where law necessarily means the application
of standards ... to the unlimited versatility of circumstance," and here administrative rather than
judicial decision making is preferred).
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through a managerial sieve" in which the costs are somehow balanced
against the benefits of enforcing rights. 261 As demonstrated above, this
phenomenon has also occurred with regard to Title VII enforcement. It
represents an unjustified intrusion of judicial notions of cost effective-
ness into a domain that Congress created without such notions.
Conclusion
Title VII was enacted by Congress as a vehicle for ridding the Amer-
ican workplace of discrimination based on race, color, religion, national
origin, and gender. The statute sweeps broadly, prohibiting uninten-
tional as well as intentional acts of discrimination. A judge-made cost
defense has, however, quietly but significantly undercut Title VII's effec-
tiveness, threatening to swallow Congress' antidiscrimination mandate.
This defense contrasts with the rejection of cost justification in analogous
areas of the law. Discriminatory practices should only be permitted in
situations of real business necessity, where productivity and not merely
profit maximization is at stake. Equal employment opportunity, as prom-
ised by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, cannot be otherwise achieved in
today's competitive business environment.
261 L. TRIBE, CONSTITTIONAL CHOICES, at viii. Tribe decries the use of "instrumental calcula-
tions of utility or... pseudo-scientific calibrations of social cost against social benefit ... whose
essence is to deny the decisionmaker's personal responsibility for choosing." Id
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